The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations centre issued two separate attack warnings on Friday, 2 October. Warning 148-26, sourced to a master at 1122 UTC, said a tanker on an outbound Strait of Hormuz transit had been struck by an unknown projectile, leaving a small fire and a blackout on board. The fire was extinguished and the ship remained underway. UKMTO reported no casualties and no environmental impact. Warning 149-26, again sourced to a master, followed at 2142 UTC: a crude-oil tanker about four nautical miles east of Oman reported an unknown projectile on the port side. All crew were reported safe, and no environmental impact had been reported at the time of the warning. In both products, authorities were investigating. Vessels were advised to transit with caution and report suspicious activity to UKMTO. The official PDFs name neither hull, flag, cargo, projectile nor a responsible party.
Anadolu Agency, Arab Times and gCaptain carried 148-26 the same day. AFP, through Gulf News into Saturday morning, put both Friday products on one tape. Clearwater Dynamics logged 149-26 as CW Alert 004 (Oct 26), classifying it as an attack and locating it near the strait without a precise position. gCaptain’s Mike Schuler, writing after 148-26 but before the 2142 UTC product, said Friday’s outbound hit brought the number of vessels reported struck in the waterway since Sunday, 28 September, to at least six. 149-26 sits after that six-count. Neither warning is a rewrite of Thursday’s Warning 147-26, of Wednesday’s time-late 144-26 / 145-26 / 146-26 pack, or of Tuesday’s 143-26 / Al Funtas file.
The public record is still thin because the reporting channel is voluntary and names are withheld. That is enough for a bridge and a DPA. It is not a basis for treating Friday as a completed weekly tape, and it is not a basis for reconstructing an attacker from secondary market colour.
Two master reports, ten hours apart
148-26 is the first Friday product. The master reported the strike during an outbound transit inside the strait. The useful operational facts are the combination of a small fire and a blackout, then a ship that stayed underway after the fire was put out. A chief engineer has to brief that as an electrical and fire-main problem, not as a naming exercise. 149-26 is a second master report, about ten hours later, and it is geographically different: four nautical miles east of Oman, a crude-oil tanker, port-side strike, crew safe, no fire stated in the UKMTO text, no pollution reported “at present time.” Clearwater repeated the same gaps. Do not collapse the two warnings into one hull. Do not move 149-26 back inside the TSS just because the first Friday ship was outbound in the strait.
Industry matching is not a UKMTO naming. The Maritime Executive, writing Friday afternoon, said security consultancy Ambrey had associated the outbound fire-and-blackout ship with a Panama-flagged crude-oil tanker about 5.3 nautical miles off Oman and with smoke from the after end. Treat that as matching colour on 148-26, not as a flag or a position UKMTO published. Hamerintel and other flashes that add an Iranian cruise-missile claim, a named attacker or a second unverified pair of hulls are not this file. Stay with the two official warnings.
Thursday’s Warning 147-26 remains a separate product. UKMTO still has not named that tanker. Marisks, Riviera, World Ports and the Indian embassy in Muscat have since matched it to the Kuwait-flag VLCC Kazimah III, IMO 9329693, about 317,250 dwt, owned, managed and operated by Kuwait Oil Tanker Company — the second reported KOTC VLCC after Al Funtas. The embassy said on Friday that it had coordinated the safe landing in Oman of five Indian crew from that ship. Moneycontrol timed the strike to 1 October and to UKMTO’s third-party fire report. That is an increment on the already-published 147-26 piece. It does not identify Friday’s two master reports, and it does not convert 148-26 or 149-26 into a KOTC naming.
SEVERE still sits under Friday’s tape
The last official regional picture is still the Joint Maritime Information Center’s Update 101, information cut-off 011500 UTC on Thursday. That note counted four confirmed attacks or disruptions in the previous 96 hours — 143-26, 144-26, 145-26 and 146-26 — and held the Strait of Hormuz at SEVERE, with deliberate attacks highly likely. IRGC UAV overflight, targeted surveillance and occasional VHF hailing were still in the text. AIS-on ships were told to expect elevated projectile risk and directed hails toward the northern Iranian-controlled route. A mining watch in and next to the traffic-separation scheme was unchanged. Independent commodity counts were still in single digits; U.S. NCAGS averaged about 30 vessel transits a day against a 2025 baseline of about 138. No later JMIC update covering 147-26, 148-26 or 149-26 was on the public board at the time of writing. A master who planned a weekend transit on Update 101’s four-incident count is now three UKMTO attack products behind that cut-off.
The operational implication is not a new listed area and not a Hormuz reopen. It is that Thursday’s fire did not close the week. Friday produced two further master-reported projectile strikes, one inside the outbound lane with a fire and a blackout, and one on a crude tanker just east of Oman after dark. The southern Omani corridor and the first miles of the Gulf of Oman exit are both in the picture. A ship making for Khor Fakkan, Fujairah, Sohar or a Gulf of Oman STS still needs a projectile watch, a fire-and-blackout drill, and a pollution and disabled-hull lookout for unnamed tankers that may not be on AIS.
Hold the published hygiene. Neutral transit, a 30-nautical-mile standoff from U.S. units, prompt answers to military queries, and NAVCENT NCAGS for any Iran-port humanitarian exception remain the last official stack in Update 101. CENTCOM’s figure in that note, dated 30 September, was 125 commercial vessels redirected under the Iran-port blockade, three disabled and two boarded. The Maritime Executive repeated the 125 figure on Friday; it is still the blockade file, not Friday’s projectile file. Do not fold 148-26 or 149-26 into Yanbu loadings, the UAE MPCI container-filing mandate, Oman’s Article 10 AIS-on reminder, or Iran’s Persian Gulf Strait Authority declaration channel. Those are crude-export, documentation and coastal-state products. Friday’s warnings are two unnamed kinetic events.
What Operators Should Note
- Log two new Friday attack products, not a reprint of 147-26. 148-26: 1122 UTC, 2 October, master, outbound Hormuz tanker, unknown projectile, small fire and blackout, fire extinguished, underway, no casualties, no pollution reported. 149-26: 2142 UTC, master, crude-oil tanker 4 nm east of Oman, unknown projectile on the port side, crew safe, no pollution reported at the time. Transit with caution and report to UKMTO. Do not invent a name, flag or attacker to fill the gap.
- Keep the two warnings on separate hulls. The first is an outbound-strait fire-and-blackout case. The second is a later port-side crude strike east of Oman with no fire in the UKMTO text. Ambrey’s Panama-flag, 5.3 nm-off-Oman matching is industry colour on 148-26, not a UKMTO naming. Do not move 149-26 back into the TSS to make one story.
- Treat Kazimah III as Thursday’s file, not Friday’s. Embassy and Marisks matching of 147-26 to KOTC’s Kuwait-flag VLCC Kazimah III (IMO 9329693, about 317,250 dwt) and the landing of five Indian crew in Oman is an increment on the 1 October warning. It does not identify 148-26 or 149-26. Al Funtas remains the earlier KOTC VLCC, already covered.
- Keep Update 101 on the bridge and add three later attack warnings on top of it. The 011500 UTC cut-off counted 143-26 to 146-26 and held SEVERE. 147-26, 148-26 and 149-26 are outside that window. AIS-on projectile risk, VHF hails toward the northern route, and a mining watch in and next to the TSS were not withdrawn.
- Brief fire, blackout and a disabled-hull lookout, not a naming exercise. Citadel, fire-main isolation, emergency power and steering-gear redundancy are the night orders for 148-26. 149-26 adds a port-side hull-integrity and cargo-tank check on a crude tanker just east of Oman. Unnamed ships that stay underway after a fire can still be navigation objects off Musandam, Khor Fakkan or Fujairah.
- Hold the published hygiene and keep this off the Yanbu, MPCI, Oman AIS and PGSA desks. Neutral transit, 30-nautical-mile U.S.-unit standoff, NAVCENT NCAGS for any Iran-port exception, no Iranian cargo lift beyond fuel and stores. CENTCOM’s 125 redirected / 3 disabled / 2 boarded figure is the blockade file. CSO, master and underwriters own 148-26 and 149-26 until a named casualty or pollution statement appears.
Regulas Shipping will keep lining Warnings 148-26 and 149-26 against Thursday’s 147-26 fire and JMIC Update 101 so operators can treat Friday’s two unnamed tanker strikes as new attack products, not as a completed weekly tape or a reason to assume the southern Omani corridor has gone quiet.
