The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations centre published Warning 199-26 as a numbered product on its 8 November board. The UKMTO Operations Centre posted the warning at about 0912 UTC on 8 November under the title UKMTO WARNING 199-26. The face of the product is titled 199-26 — SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY. UKMTO states that it has received a time-late report of an incident 8 nautical miles northwest of Khasab, Oman. Military authorities reported the tanker is on fire which has resulted in the evacuation of the crew. Vessels are advised to transit with caution and report any suspicious activity to UKMTO, whilst authorities investigate. The location associated with the product is Khasab, Oman. Emergency contacts printed on UKMTO warnings remain [email protected], +44 (0) 2392 222060, +44 (0) 7779 966976 and +44 (0) 7585 795608.
That is the working primary. Sunday morning’s product is a Suspicious Activity warning on a time-late tanker-fire clock, 8 nautical miles northwest of Khasab, crew evacuated, source Military authorities, posted on 8 November. It is not a rewrite of Saturday night’s dedicated Advisory 198-26, not a rewrite of Friday night’s dedicated Warning 197-26, and not a conversion of this morning’s dedicated Warning 200-26 onto an earlier Khasab fire. It names a tanker, a fire, an evacuation, an 8-nautical-mile northwest-of-Khasab offset, and a military-authorities source. It does not name a merchant hull, an IMO number, a flag, a cargo grade, an attacker, a projectile, a mine, a small-boat device, a boarding, a NUC or tow line, a latitude/longitude beyond the 8-nautical-mile offset, a casualty count, an environmental line, or a keep-clear radius. UKMTO posted the numbered warning on the 8 November product board against a time-late Saturday clock. Masters who brief Sunday morning as 197-26’s unnamed east-of-Khasab tanker now recast as a northwest fire, as 200-26’s outbound projectile tanker, as 198-26’s Khor Fakkan bulk carrier, or as 187-26’s 25-nautical-mile northeast-of-Khasab fire will have merged four other series into a Suspicious Activity product that still withholds the hull and still withholds a projectile.
What the warning actually printed
The confirmed tape is the body of 199-26. UKMTO has received a time-late report of an incident 8 nautical miles northwest of Khasab, Oman. Military authorities reported the tanker is on fire which has resulted in the evacuation of the crew. Vessels are advised to transit with caution and report any suspicious activity to UKMTO, whilst authorities investigate. That is the product. Stay with that wording. Do not invent a hull. Do not invent a flag. Do not invent a products, crude, LPG or LNG grade beyond the word tanker. Do not invent a UAV, a mine, a small-boat device, a boarding or a projectile. 199-26 prints fire and evacuation, not Attack, not struck, and not projectile. Do not invent a lat/long on the UKMTO product. 199-26 does not print one. Do not invent a keep-clear radius around Khasab, Lima, Musandam, Fujairah or the TSS. The product does not print one. Do not invent a fire-extinguished line, a lost-propulsion line, a sunk line, a crew-safe-onboard line, or a next-port name. The product already prints evacuation. It does not print that the crew remained on board. It does not print a destination. The crew line on this product is evacuation, not “safe and are accounted for,” not “unconfirmed at present,” and not “one seafarer fatality.” Hold that wording. The damage line is a tanker on fire. Hold that too.
The product type is the first briefing fact. 199-26 is Suspicious Activity, the same family that ran dedicated 185-26 and dedicated 187-26 before that number was updated to Attack, not the Attack family that ran dedicated 191-26 through 197-26 and this morning’s dedicated 200-26, and not the Advisory family that ran dedicated 198-26. UKMTO says a tanker 8 nautical miles northwest of Khasab is on fire and the crew have been evacuated. It does not say a small boat attached devices. It does not say a mine in the water. It does not say a UAV. It does not say an unknown projectile. It does not say the ship is at anchor, NUC, under tow, or sunk. A DPA who briefs Sunday morning as “another Hormuz Attack, tanker, projectile, crew safe” has borrowed 200-26’s product type, 200-26’s method and 197-26’s crew-safe line and has dropped the Suspicious Activity stamp, the fire, the evacuation, the 8-nautical-mile northwest-of-Khasab offset and the military-authorities source that are the whole of this warning. A DPA who briefs Sunday morning as a completed salvage because the crew left the ship has over-read a numbered Suspicious Activity product that still withholds hull, cause, damage volume and environmental impact.
Time-late Military authorities source, a fire and an evacuation line is the second briefing fact. The report sits on a Military authorities source, not on Master, not on Verified, and not on a Company Security Officer. That is a different reporting path from Friday night’s dedicated 197-26, whose source line was Master, and from this morning’s dedicated 200-26, whose source line is Company Security Officer. Time-late is printed on the face of the product. The numbered warning appeared on the 8 November board. Do not treat the 8 November post as an 8 November strike. Do not treat “time-late” as a completed investigation. Do not treat “fire” as a confirmed UAV, a confirmed mine, a confirmed small-boat pairing, or a confirmed projectile strike. Do not treat “evacuation of the crew” as a class survey, and do not convert it into 197-26’s crew-safe-onboard line or into 200-26’s “all crew are safe and accounted for” line. The public product says the tanker is on fire and the crew have been evacuated. It does not say whether the fire is out, whether a hole was found, whether a tug was offered, how many people left the ship, or where those people were taken.
The geography is the third briefing fact. 199-26 prints 8 nautical miles northwest of Khasab, Oman. The location associated with the product is Khasab, Oman. That is the Musandam / western-Hormuz face, inside the strait relative to Khasab, not Friday night’s 16-nautical-mile east-of-Khasab Hormuz-outbound offset, not this morning’s dedicated 200-26 Strait of Hormuz footer with no nautical-mile offset, and not Saturday night’s 18-nautical-mile east-of-Khor-Fakkan Gulf of Oman offset. Northwest of Khasab sits toward the inner strait and the Iranian coast, not toward the Gulf of Oman exit that 197-26 used. Eight nautical miles of offset wording and a compass change from east to northwest separate 199-26 from 197-26 on different dates, with different product types and different crew states. A passage plan that only carried 197-26’s east-of-Khasab tanker, or that treated Sunday as closed because 198-26 was the last UKMTO number at 03:30 UTC, has not budgeted a time-late tanker fire 8 nautical miles northwest of Khasab.
The numbering is the fourth briefing fact. 199-26 is numbered after 198-26 on the product board. It is a Warning, Suspicious Activity, not an Advisory. UKMTO’s Advisory series still ends at dedicated 198-26. Do not brief Sunday morning as “199 after 198 on the same hull.” Brief Sunday morning as a later-issued Warning on a later Khasab tanker-fire clock, posted time-late on 8 November. UKMTO now also carries dedicated 200-26 on the Attack line. 199-26 and 200-26 are two Sunday products. They are not one tanker filed twice.
Industry colour of the same clock, held separately: JNS restated the public sentences on 8 November, repeating the 8-nautical-mile northwest-of-Khasab offset, the fire, the evacuation, the Suspicious Activity face and the transit-with-caution advice. Iran International restated a delayed report of a tanker on fire and crew evacuated 8 nautical miles northwest of Khasab. Mehr News restated the time-late formula and the military-authorities fire-and-evacuation sentences; its English body printed “8KM” against a headline that kept 8 nautical miles — hold 8 nautical miles, treat 8KM as a wire slip, not a 199-26 fact. Arab Times restated a delayed 7 November clock at approximately 1920 UTC. That 1920 UTC line is colour of a wire rewrite this run, not a retrieved PDF incident-time stamp. Do not promote 1920 UTC onto 199-26 as a PDF fact. Do not collapse those reprints onto 199-26 as a completed identification, a TSS plot, a projectile, an IRGC mine, a CENTCOM naming, or a conversion onto 197-26, 198-26 or 200-26. Mapping accounts that labelled Sunday’s fire an IRGC attack are colour, not a 199-26 naming. No numbered MSCIO wrap against the northwest-of-Khasab fire clock was retrieved this run.
What this is not
This is not Warning 200-26, and it is not this morning’s unnamed outbound Hormuz projectile tanker. This morning’s dedicated Warning 200-26 remains an Attack, incident 7 November 2026, 2020 UTC, source Company Security Officer, time-late, filename 20261108-ukmto_warning-200-26.pdf: tanker struck by an unknown projectile while transiting outbound through the Strait of Hormuz; all crew safe and accounted for; no reported environmental impact at this time; location footer Strait of Hormuz. 199-26 is Suspicious Activity, time-late, tanker on fire, crew evacuated, 8 nautical miles northwest of Khasab, source Military authorities. A CSO Attack that prints a projectile, a crew-safe-onboard line and no environmental impact is not a Suspicious Activity warning that prints a fire, an evacuation and a northwest-of-Khasab offset. Do not convert Sunday’s fire onto Sunday’s projectile. Do not convert Sunday’s evacuation onto Sunday’s crew-safe line. Do not promote an unknown projectile onto a product that prints fire and does not print struck.
This is not Warning 197-26, and it is not Friday night’s unnamed east-of-Khasab tanker. Friday night’s dedicated Warning 197-26 remains an Attack, incident 5 November 2026, 2200 UTC, source Master, time-late, filename 20261106-ukmto_warning-197-26.pdf: tanker transiting the Strait of Hormuz outbound, explosion at the waterline, port side, 16 nautical miles east of Khasab, Oman; crew safe and accounted for; tanker still under its own power and continuing on its voyage; location footer Khasab, Oman. 199-26 is 8 November post, Suspicious Activity, fire, evacuation, 8 nautical miles northwest of Khasab, military authorities. Two days, a product-type change, a compass change from east to northwest, and a crew-state change from onboard-safe to evacuated separate the two clocks. A Master Attack that prints a waterline explosion, a crew-safe line and a continuing voyage is not a Suspicious Activity warning that prints a fire and an evacuation. Do not convert Sunday’s tanker onto Friday’s Khasab tanker. Do not convert Friday’s port-side waterline explosion onto Sunday’s unnamed northwest fire.
This is not Advisory 198-26, and it is not Saturday night’s unnamed Khor Fakkan bulk carrier. Saturday night’s dedicated Advisory 198-26 remains an Advisory, report date 7 November 2026, incident time TBC, source Military authorities, filename 20261107-ukmto_advisory-198-26.pdf: bulk carrier and military forces in the Gulf of Oman, approximately 18 nautical miles east of Khor Fakkan, UAE; crew, damage and environment unknown; location footer Khor Fakkan, UAE. CENTCOM’s 7 November Huda statement remains wrap on that number, unused as a completed PDF naming. 199-26 is a Warning, Suspicious Activity, tanker, fire, evacuation, 8 nautical miles northwest of Khasab. A Gulf of Oman bulk-carrier Advisory is not a Musandam tanker-fire Warning. Do not convert Sunday’s tanker onto Saturday’s bulk carrier. Do not promote Huda, St. Kitts and Nevis, or precision munitions onto 199-26.
This is not Warning 187-26, and it is not a 29 October Khasab fire filed again. Dedicated Warning 187-26 remains the 29 October 2212 UTC product, first posted as Suspicious Activity on a third-party outbound fire 25 nautical miles northeast of Khasab, later Update 001 Attack: small boat attached two explosive devices above the waterline, engine-room fire, crew safe, no environmental impact, vessel continuing. 199-26 is a later 8 November Suspicious Activity fire 8 nautical miles northwest of Khasab, crew evacuated, cause withheld. Seventeen nautical miles of offset wording, a compass change, an evacuation versus crew-safe-onboard, and ten days separate the two clocks. Do not brief Sunday morning as “187-26’s tanker on fire again.” Do not promote attached devices onto a product that prints fire and does not print a small boat.
This is not Warning 185-26, not 196-26 / Velos Sapphire, not 195-26, not Louise 1, and not a Selat Storm naming. Dedicated 185-26 remains the 9-nautical-mile north-of-Khasab third-party fire later updated as a dhow that listed and sank, crew evacuated. Thursday morning’s dedicated Warning 196-26 remains a Verified Attack, tanker, two unidentified projectiles, 50 nautical miles north of Madinat ash Shamal; Friday afternoon’s dedicated IMO 129-count remains the Velos Sapphire fatality conversion on that Qatar sheet. Tuesday night’s dedicated Warning 195-26 remains a CSO Attack, two unknown projectiles into the engine room, 14 nautical miles northeast of Lima. IMO still prints LOUISE 1 (IMO 9290323), 29 October, 25 nautical miles northeast of Khasab, Damaged, no pollution. Dedicated NAVAREA IX 425/26 remains tug boat Selat Storm sunk 0.6 nautical miles west of Jazirat Um Al Ghanam. 199-26 prints Suspicious Activity, tanker, fire, evacuation, 8 nautical miles northwest of Khasab. It does not print dhow, Qatar, Lima, Velos Sapphire, Louise 1, or Um Al Ghanam. Do not collapse those files onto this number because they share Khasab, fire, Hormuz or a November date line.
This is not Update 112, not a 130th IMO row, and not NAVAREA IX 434/26. Last week’s dedicated Update 111, ICOD 051300 UTC 5 November, remains the last numbered public periodic note. Its confirmed-incidents table closed at 191-26 through 196-26. 197-26, 198-26, 199-26 and 200-26 all sit after that cut-off. IMO’s highlighted-incidents board still prints 129 confirmed incidents and 25 confirmed seafarer fatalities as at 6 November, with VELOS SAPPHIRE as the named top row. IMO has not named 199-26, 200-26, 198-26, 197-26, 195-26, 194-26, 193-26, 191-26, Al Jusufi, Quba, AZINI or Huda. The fatality line is still 25, on Velos Sapphire, not on this warning. NAVAREA IX still lists 433/26 as the 070300 UTC 7 November self-cancelling in-force list atop dedicated 432/26 and dedicated 431/26. No 201-26, no Update 112, no IMO 130, no ARN 169, no 434/26 and no official NAVWARN 813 this run. Official MSCIO alerts index showed no numbered wrap against the northwest-of-Khasab fire clock.
Operational implications
For a master already shaping a Hormuz inbound or outbound, Musandam, Khasab, Lima, Fujairah, Khor Fakkan, Sohar or Gulf of Oman coastal transit, or holding in the Southern Gulf this morning, Sunday is a same-morning Suspicious Activity fire on a time-late tanker clock 8 nautical miles northwest of Khasab, on top of this morning’s dedicated 200-26 outbound projectile Attack, on top of Saturday night’s dedicated 198-26 Khor Fakkan bulk-carrier Advisory, and on top of Friday night’s dedicated 197-26 east-of-Khasab waterline explosion. Update 111 remains the last numbered JMIC note and still prints Hormuz SEVERE and Arabian Gulf SUBSTANTIAL, with an ICOD that closed before this clock. 016-26 remains the working blockade document pack for hulls that still need the Strait. 199-26 adds a tanker that had already been reported on fire 8 nautical miles northwest of Khasab, with the crew already evacuated when the time-late warning was posted. A passage plan that only carried 198-26’s TBC Khor Fakkan Advisory, or that treated Sunday as closed because 198-26 was the last UKMTO number at 03:30 UTC, has not budgeted a northwest-of-Khasab fire and has not budgeted 200-26’s 2020 UTC projectile either.
A tanker on fire, learned time-late from military authorities, with the crew already evacuated, is a standoff, SAR-coordination and flooding-watch problem before it is a war-risk rewrite. 199-26 is not 197-26’s waterline-explosion, crew-safe, own-power problem. It is not 200-26’s unknown-projectile, crew-safe-onboard, no-environmental-impact problem. It is a lookout, CPA, AIS-on/AIS-off, citadel, fire-main and man-overboard-from-abandonment problem at the same time as it is a late-report problem. BMP MS fire, citadel and projectile guidance remains the working industry pack; 199-26 does not reprint it and does not order an armed team. It also does not authorise a master to treat every radar contact northwest of Khasab as a confirmed Attack, or to treat every AIS-off tanker as 197-26, 200-26 or Louise 1 after the fact. Log the Warning number, the Suspicious Activity face, the time-late stamp, the Military authorities source line, the tanker type, the fire, the evacuation, and the 8-nautical-mile northwest-of-Khasab offset. Do not log a hull, a projectile, a mine, a small-boat device, 200-26’s 2020 UTC clock, 197-26’s port-side waterline explosion, a NUC, a sunk line, or an Omani-port finding that the product does not print.
The missing hull, cause, fire-status and damage-volume lines are the practical damage watch, not a completed all-clear. The public tape says the tanker is on fire and the crew have been evacuated. Those are status sentences. They are not a class survey, they are not a finding that the fire is out, and they are not a finding that there is no pollution. An evacuated tanker still on fire 8 nautical miles northwest of Khasab is a drifting-hull and TSS problem for the next ship even if Sunday’s product never prints NUC. Next-port authorities will want a written account that 199-26 does not contain. Charterers and war-risk underwriters will now ask whether the ship was 8 nautical miles northwest of Khasab on the Saturday clock, whether it reported a fire, and whether the crew left the vessel. They will not be answered by Friday night’s 197-26 Attack, by this morning’s 200-26 Attack, by IMO’s Velos Sapphire row, or by a wire that printed 1920 UTC as a substitute for the product.
For a DPA and an operator with any merchant hull still using Hormuz, Musandam, Khasab, Fujairah, Khor Fakkan or the Gulf of Oman, the reporting split is the operational content. Sightings of fire, smoke, an abandoned tanker, a Mayday on Channel 16, boats in the water or pollution go to UKMTO on the 199-26 action line and to the company security officer. NAVCENT NCAGS remains the 016-26 blockade mailbox for hulls that still need the Strait. MSCIO remains the EU ATALANTA registration and alert desk; no numbered MSCIO wrap against the northwest-of-Khasab fire clock was retrieved this run. Registering with one mailbox is not a substitute for the others. 199-26 does not order a daylight-only transit, a deviation around a published circle, or a halt to visit-and-search compliance. Keep Update 111 Hormuz SEVERE / Arabian Gulf SUBSTANTIAL and 016-26 visit-and-search in the master’s pack. Watch a PDF revision that names a hull, prints a type beyond tanker, a UTC clock, a NUC, a tow, a fire-out line, a casualty line or a next-port line; a NAVAREA that plots this tanker rather than Selat Storm, RITI, Quba or Louise 1; a flag or class note; a JMIC Update 112; or an IMO-board row — not a headline that 200-26 closed Sunday’s fire or completed a salvage.
Keep the dedicated files on their own lines. 200-26 remains this morning’s dedicated CSO Attack on an outbound Hormuz tanker, unknown projectile, 2020 UTC 7 November, crew safe, no environmental impact, footer Strait of Hormuz. 198-26 remains Saturday night’s dedicated Advisory on a bulk carrier and military forces 18 nautical miles east of Khor Fakkan, incident time TBC; CENTCOM’s Huda statement remains wrap. 197-26 remains Friday night’s dedicated Master Attack on a tanker 16 nautical miles east of Khasab, explosion at the waterline port side, crew safe, under own power. 196-26 remains Thursday morning’s dedicated Verified Attack on a tanker 50 nautical miles north of Madinat ash Shamal, two unidentified projectiles, crew unconfirmed; Friday afternoon’s dedicated IMO 129-count remains the Velos Sapphire fatality conversion on that Qatar sheet, wrap, not a 199-26 hull. 195-26 remains Tuesday night’s dedicated CSO Attack on a tanker 14 nautical miles northeast of Lima. 187-26 remains the dedicated 29 October 25-nautical-mile northeast-of-Khasab fire later updated to attached devices. Update 111 remains ICOD 051300 UTC, 172 incidents, six counted since the last report through 196-26. 016-26 remains the blockade document pack. This morning’s dedicated Kerkyra 201/26 remains the Zakynthos firing box 9–13 November. This morning’s dedicated Irakleio 1409/26 remains the Plateia firing windows on 9 and 16 November. Do not recast 8 November morning as a named Khasab tanker, as 197-26 recast, as 200-26’s projectile filed twice, as Update 112, or as IMO moving the fatality line off Velos Sapphire.
What Operators Should Note
- Log 199-26 as an 8 November Khasab tanker-fire Warning on a time-late military-authorities clock, not as a 197-26 rewrite and not as a 200-26 rewrite. UKMTO Warning 199-26, Suspicious Activity, posted about 0912 UTC on 8 November, source Military authorities, time-late. Tanker on fire 8 nautical miles northwest of Khasab, Oman. Crew evacuated. Transit with caution. Report suspicious activity to UKMTO, [email protected] / +44 (0) 2392 222060. Authorities are investigating. Location Khasab, Oman. UKMTO printed neither hull, IMO, flag, cargo, attacker, projectile, lat/long beyond the 8-nautical-mile offset, anchorage, NUC, tow, next port, casualty count, environmental line, nor a keep-clear radius. This is not 200-26, not 197-26, not 198-26 / Huda, not 187-26, and not Velos Sapphire.
- Hold the product type, the water and the evacuation line. 199-26 is Suspicious Activity, not Attack and not Advisory. The working post is 8 November. The working source is Military authorities, not Master and not Company Security Officer. The working type is tanker. The working water is 8 nautical miles northwest of Khasab, Oman — not 16 nautical miles east of Khasab and not 18 nautical miles east of Khor Fakkan. The working method is a fire — not an unknown projectile and not a waterline explosion. The crew line is evacuated, not “safe and accounted for” onboard. The product number is 199. Do not brief Sunday morning as “197-26’s Khasab tanker, now on fire to the northwest.” Do not treat the 8 November post as an 8 November strike. Do not promote Arab Times’ approximately 1920 UTC 7 November clock onto the product as a retrieved PDF incident time; hold that clock as wire colour.
- Hold 200-26 on its own line, one product later on the same Sunday board. Dedicated 200-26 remains Attack, 7 November 2026, 2020 UTC, source Company Security Officer, time-late, filename
20261108-ukmto_warning-200-26.pdf: tanker struck by an unknown projectile while transiting outbound through the Strait of Hormuz; all crew safe and accounted for; no reported environmental impact; footer Strait of Hormuz. 199-26 is fire, evacuation, 8 nautical miles northwest of Khasab, Suspicious Activity. Two Sunday warnings are two Sunday warnings. Do not merge the fire into the projectile. Do not merge the evacuation into the crew-safe line. Do not treat 2020 UTC as 199-26’s clock. - Hold wire colour separately. JNS, Iran International and Mehr restated the public fire, 8-nautical-mile northwest-of-Khasab offset, evacuation and time-late sentences. Mehr’s “8KM” is a slip; the working offset is 8 nautical miles. Arab Times restated approximately 1920 UTC on 7 November. Mapping accounts labelled the fire an IRGC attack. Treat those reprints as colour, not as a 199-26 naming, a TSS plot, a projectile, a mine, or a conversion onto 197-26, 198-26 or 200-26. No numbered MSCIO wrap against this clock was retrieved this run.
- Do not collapse 197-26, 198-26, 187-26 or Velos Sapphire onto this number. 197-26 remains Friday night’s dedicated Master Attack on a tanker 16 nautical miles east of Khasab, explosion at the waterline port side, crew safe, under own power. 198-26 remains Saturday night’s dedicated Advisory on a bulk carrier and military forces 18 nautical miles east of Khor Fakkan, TBC; CENTCOM’s Huda statement remains wrap. 187-26 remains the dedicated 29 October 25-nautical-mile northeast-of-Khasab fire later updated to attached devices. IMO still prints 129 confirmed / 25 dead as at 6 November, with VELOS SAPPHIRE as the named top row — wrap on dedicated 196-26, not this morning’s dedicated file. Five products are five products. A northwest-of-Khasab fire is a sixth overnight file. Do not make them one hull.
- Treat the missing hull, cause, fire-status and damage-volume lines as open damage lines. The public tape prints tanker, fire, evacuation, 8 nautical miles northwest of Khasab, time-late, military authorities. It does not print a hull, a cargo grade, a fire-out line, a survey, a hole size, a NUC interval, a tug, a next-port name or a class note. Keep Update 111 Hormuz SEVERE / Arabian Gulf SUBSTANTIAL and 016-26 visit-and-search in the master’s pack. Sightings of fire, smoke, an abandoned tanker or boats in the water go to UKMTO, MSCIO, the Omani authorities and the CSO. Watch a PDF revision that names a hull or prints a UTC clock; a NAVAREA that plots this tanker rather than Louise 1 or Selat Storm; a flag or class note; a JMIC Update 112; or an IMO-board row — not a headline that 200-26 closed Sunday’s fire or completed a salvage.
Regulas Shipping will keep lining Warning 199-26 against this morning’s dedicated Warning 200-26 and against Friday night’s dedicated Warning 197-26 so operators can treat Sunday morning’s tape as a numbered time-late Suspicious Activity fire 8 nautical miles northwest of Khasab, not as an east-of-Khasab Attack rewrite, an outbound-projectile reprint, or a completed class survey.
