The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations centre published Advisory 198-26 as a numbered PDF on its product board, filename 20261107-ukmto_advisory-198-26.pdf. The face of the product is titled 198-26 — ADVISORY. The report date is 7 November 2026. The incident time is printed TBC. The source line is Military authorities. UKMTO states that it has received a report of an incident involving a bulk carrier and military forces in the Gulf of Oman, approximately 18 nautical miles east of Khor Fakkan, UAE. Status of crew, damage assessment and environmental impact are unknown at time of report. Authorities are aware and relevant investigations remain ongoing. Vessels are advised to consider the latest maritime security information and maintain awareness of the evolving operational environment. The location footer printed on the product is Khor Fakkan, UAE. Emergency contacts printed on the product remain [email protected], +44 (0) 2392 222060, +44 (0) 7779 966976 and +44 (0) 7585 795608.
That is the working primary. Saturday night’s product is an Advisory on a 7 November report date, incident time TBC, bulk carrier and military forces, 18 nautical miles east of Khor Fakkan in the Gulf of Oman. It is not a rewrite of last night’s dedicated Warning 197-26, not a rewrite of 21 October’s dedicated Advisory 178-26, and not a conversion of dedicated Advisory 163-26 / Ocean Molica onto a later Khor Fakkan offset. It names a bulk carrier, military forces, a Gulf of Oman plot, and an 18-nautical-mile east-of-Khor-Fakkan offset. It does not name a merchant hull, an IMO number, a flag, a cargo grade, a military service, a munition, a boarding, a diversion, a hail, damage, a crew-safe line, a NUC or tow line, a latitude/longitude beyond the 18-nautical-mile offset, or a keep-clear radius. UKMTO posted the numbered PDF on the 7 November product board against a TBC clock. Masters who brief Saturday night as 197-26’s unnamed Khasab tanker now recast as a Khor Fakkan bulk carrier, as Ocean Molica leaving Bandar Abbas, as 178-26’s Duqm tanker, or as 177-26’s Khor Fakkan tug will have merged four other series into an Advisory that still withholds the hull and still withholds the incident time.
What the advisory actually printed
The confirmed tape is the body of 198-26. UKMTO has received a report of an incident involving a bulk carrier and military forces in the Gulf of Oman, approximately 18 nautical miles east of Khor Fakkan, UAE. Status of crew, damage assessment and environmental impact are unknown at time of report. Authorities are aware and relevant investigations remain ongoing. Vessels are advised to consider the latest maritime security information and maintain awareness of the evolving operational environment. That is the product. Stay with that wording. Do not invent a hull. Do not invent a flag. Do not invent a grain, ore, steel or bagged-cargo grade beyond the words bulk carrier. Do not invent a U.S., Iranian, Omani, Emirati or other service. Do not invent a precision munition, a boarding, a diversion, a hail, a blockade finding, a fire, a NUC or a sunk line. 198-26 prints incident, not Attack, not struck, and not disabled. Do not invent a lat/long on the UKMTO PDF. 198-26 does not print one. Do not invent a keep-clear radius around Khor Fakkan, Fujairah, Sohar, Musandam or the TSS. The PDF does not print one. Do not invent a crew-safe line. The product prints unknown. Do not invent a UTC clock. The product prints TBC.
The product type is the first briefing fact. 198-26 is an Advisory, the same family as dedicated 178-26 and dedicated 163-26, not the Attack family that ran dedicated 191-26 through 197-26, and not the Suspicious Activity family that ran 185-26 and 190-26. UKMTO did not say the ship was struck. It did not say the ship was boarded. It did not say the ship was diverted, disabled, or left underway. It did not say the crew were safe. The missing damage, environment and crew lines are omissions, not a completed class survey and not a completed MARPOL finding. A DPA who briefs Saturday night as “another Hormuz Attack, tanker, projectile, crew unconfirmed” has borrowed 197-26’s product type, 196-26’s method and Thursday morning’s unconfirmed crew line and has dropped the Advisory stamp, the bulk-carrier type, the TBC clock and the 18-nautical-mile east-of-Khor-Fakkan offset that are the whole of this PDF. A DPA who briefs Saturday night as a completed disablement because later colour named a hull has over-read a numbered Advisory that still withholds hull, time, damage and force.
Report date 7 November, incident time TBC, source Military authorities is the second briefing fact. The report sits on a Military authorities source, not on Master, not on Verified, and not on a Company Security Officer. That is a different reporting path from last night’s dedicated 197-26, whose source line was Master, and from Thursday morning’s dedicated 196-26, whose source line was Verified. TBC is printed on the face of the product. The report date is 7 November. Do not treat the 7 November filename as a completed UTC strike time. Do not treat “TBC” as 2200 UTC, as 2320 UTC, or as last night’s Khasab clock. Do not treat “incident involving a bulk carrier and military forces” as a confirmed UAV, a confirmed mine, a confirmed small-boat pairing, a confirmed two-projectile strike, or a confirmed precision-munition disablement. Do not treat “unknown at time of report” as a class survey, and do not convert it into last night’s crew-safe line. The public PDF says authorities are aware and investigations remain ongoing. It does not say whether a fire started, whether a hole was found, whether a tug was offered, or where the ship went after the report.
The geography is the third briefing fact. 198-26 prints approximately 18 nautical miles east of Khor Fakkan, UAE. The location footer is Khor Fakkan, UAE. The water line is Gulf of Oman. That is the United Arab Emirates east-coast / western Gulf of Oman face, not last night’s 16-nautical-mile east-of-Khasab Hormuz-outbound offset, not Thursday morning’s 50-nautical-mile north-of-Madinat-ash-Shamal offset, and not 21 October’s 121-nautical-mile east-of-Duqm Arabian Sea offset. Khor Fakkan sits on the UAE east coast, north of Fujairah and south of the Musandam / Hormuz exit. Eighteen nautical miles east of that port is an offshore Gulf of Oman position, not a Fujairah harbour box, not a Khor Fakkan anchorage berth, and not the Strait of Hormuz traffic-separation scheme. Friday morning’s dedicated NAVAREA IX 431/26 remains the geotechnical survey on SKATE 3D inside Port of Fujairah, four corners around 25-10 N 056-22 E, cancel 132359 UTC 13 November — a compact harbour box, not this 18-nautical-mile offset. A passage plan that only carried 197-26’s Khasab tanker, or that treated Saturday as closed because 197-26 was the last UKMTO number at 11:30 UTC, has not budgeted a TBC Advisory 18 nautical miles east of Khor Fakkan on a bulk-carrier clock.
The numbering is the fourth briefing fact. 198-26 is numbered after 197-26 on the product board. It is an Advisory, not a Warning. UKMTO’s Attack series still ends at dedicated 197-26. Do not brief Saturday night as “198 after 197 on the same hull.” Brief Saturday night as a later-issued Advisory on a later Gulf of Oman bulk-carrier clock, posted on 7 November, incident time still TBC. UKMTO now ends at 198-26 on the Advisory line. There is no 199-26 this run. There is no Warning 198-26 this run.
Industry and national-statement colour of the same clock, held separately: Arab News restated the public UKMTO sentences, repeating the bulk carrier, military forces, 18-nautical-mile east-of-Khor-Fakkan offset, unknown crew / damage / environment lines, and the consider-latest-information advice. Reuters / Times of Israel and Iran International reprinted the same public tape. Those wires do not name the hull on the UKMTO product. U.S. Central Command issued a 7 November statement naming St. Kitts-and-Nevis-flagged M/V Huda, asserting a Gulf of Oman disablement after the crew ignored repeated warnings and attempted to violate the naval blockade against Iran, and asserting that a U.S. military aircraft fired precision munitions at the stern after directing the crew to abandon targeted spaces. Anadolu Agency and Maritime Executive restated that CENTCOM release, including a 24,993 dwt / about 159-metre open-register colour line and a first-disablement-since-Ocean-Molica colour line. Treat CENTCOM’s Huda naming, the munition, the blockade finding and the disablement as colour of a national statement, not as a 198-26 PDF naming. 198-26 still prints bulk carrier, military forces, 18 nautical miles east of Khor Fakkan, crew / damage / environment unknown, incident time TBC. It does not print Huda, St. Kitts and Nevis, stern, precision munitions, blockade, or disabled. Do not promote that colour onto the PDF. No numbered MSCIO wrap against the TBC Khor Fakkan clock was retrieved this run. JMIC’s last numbered public note remains Update 111, ICOD 051300 UTC 5 November. 198-26 sits after that cut-off.
What this is not
This is not Warning 197-26, and it is not last night’s unnamed Khasab tanker. Last night’s dedicated Warning 197-26 remains an Attack, incident 5 November 2026, 2200 UTC, source Master, time-late, filename 20261106-ukmto_warning-197-26.pdf: tanker transiting the Strait of Hormuz outbound, explosion at the waterline, port side, 16 nautical miles east of Khasab, Oman; crew safe and accounted for; tanker still under its own power and continuing on its voyage; location footer Khasab, Oman. 198-26 is 7 November, incident time TBC, source Military authorities, Advisory, bulk carrier, military forces, 18 nautical miles east of Khor Fakkan, UAE, crew / damage / environment unknown. Two days, a product-type change, a ship-type change and a sea-face change separate the two clocks. A Master Attack that prints a waterline explosion, a crew-safe line and a continuing voyage is not an Advisory that prints a bulk carrier, military forces and unknown status. Do not convert Saturday’s bulk carrier onto Friday’s Khasab tanker. Do not convert Friday’s waterline explosion onto Saturday’s unnamed Khor Fakkan casualty. Do not promote a Hormuz outbound tanker onto a PDF that prints Gulf of Oman.
This is not Advisory 178-26, and it is not 21 October’s unnamed Duqm tanker. 21 October’s dedicated Advisory 178-26 remains an Advisory, incident 19 October 2026, 1000 UTC, source Verified, filename 20261019-ukmto_advisory-178-26.pdf: tanker and military forces approximately 121 nautical miles east of Duqm, Oman; tanker subject to interaction as part of ongoing military activity; location footer Duqm, Oman; MSCIO Advisory 09-2026 reprints that clock in the Arabian Sea. 198-26 is 7 November, TBC, source Military authorities, bulk carrier, 18 nautical miles east of Khor Fakkan, Gulf of Oman. Nineteen days, a sea change and a ship-type change separate the two clocks. A tanker-and-military-forces Advisory 121 nautical miles east of Duqm is not a bulk-carrier-and-military-forces Advisory 18 nautical miles east of Khor Fakkan. The two Advisories share a formula. They do not share a sea. Do not convert Saturday’s bulk carrier onto October’s Duqm tanker. Do not invent an “interaction as part of ongoing military activity” sentence on 198-26 because 178-26 printed one. 198-26 prints “incident involving.” Hold that wording.
This is not Advisory 163-26, and it is not a second Ocean Molica naming. Dedicated Advisory 163-26 remains the 11 October Gulf of Oman tanker-and-military-forces Advisory. JMIC later named M/V Ocean Molica against that number. CENTCOM colour of that earlier clock stays on 163-26. 198-26 is 7 November, bulk carrier, 18 nautical miles east of Khor Fakkan, hull withheld. Do not move Ocean Molica onto 198-26. Do not brief Saturday night as “Ocean Molica hit again.” Do not promote a 10 October disablement onto a 7 November Advisory that still withholds the hull. CENTCOM’s 7 November Huda statement is wrap on tonight’s 198-26, unused as a completed PDF naming, the same way Ocean Molica was wrap on 163-26 until JMIC printed the name against that number.
This is not Warning 177-26, and it is not a Khor Fakkan tug Attack filed again. Dedicated 177-26 remains the Khor Fakkan tug number. 198-26 prints bulk carrier, Advisory, 18 nautical miles east of Khor Fakkan, military forces. A tug Attack on that coast is not a bulk-carrier Advisory 18 nautical miles offshore. Do not collapse Saturday night onto 177-26 because both print Khor Fakkan in the location line.
This is not NAVAREA IX 431/26, and it is not a Fujairah harbour survey. Friday morning’s dedicated 431/26 remains geotechnical survey in progress at Port of Fujairah by self-elevating platform SKATE 3D in a four-corner harbour box around 25-10.08N 056-22.38E, mariners cautioned, cancel 132359 UTC 13 November. 198-26 prints neither SKATE 3D, a harbour box, nor a 13 November kill. Eighteen nautical miles east of Khor Fakkan is not inside Port of Fujairah. Do not brief Saturday night as “SKATE 3D became a military-interaction Advisory.”
This is not Warning 196-26, not 195-26, not 194-26, not Velos Sapphire, and not a Selat Storm naming. Thursday morning’s dedicated Warning 196-26 remains an Attack, tanker, two unidentified projectiles, 50 nautical miles north of Madinat ash Shamal, crew unconfirmed. Tuesday night’s dedicated Warning 195-26 remains a CSO Attack, tanker, two unknown projectiles into the engine room, 14 nautical miles northeast of Lima. Tuesday night’s dedicated Warning 194-26 remains a Verified Attack on an Indian crewed dhow outbound through Hormuz. Friday afternoon’s dedicated IMO 129-count remains Velos Sapphire, IMO 9321201, one seafarer fatality, as at 6 November. Dedicated NAVAREA IX 425/26 remains tug boat Selat Storm sunk in 26-22.55N 056-20.47E. 198-26 prints Advisory, bulk carrier, Khor Fakkan, 18 nautical miles east, military forces, unknown status. It does not print tanker, projectile, Qatar, Lima, dhow, Velos Sapphire, or Um Al Ghanam. Do not collapse those files onto this number because they share a Gulf, a UAE east-coast tag, or a November date line.
This is not Update 112, not a 130th IMO row, and not NAVAREA IX 433/26 as a new hazard. Last night’s dedicated Update 111, ICOD 051300 UTC 5 November, remains the last numbered public periodic note. Its confirmed-incidents table closed at 191-26 through 196-26. 197-26 sat after that cut-off as last night’s dedicated Attack. 198-26 sits further after that cut-off as an Advisory. IMO’s highlighted-incidents board still prints 129 confirmed incidents and 25 confirmed seafarer fatalities as at 6 November, with VELOS SAPPHIRE as the named top row. IMO has not named 198-26, 197-26, 195-26, 194-26, 193-26, 191-26, Al Jusufi, Quba or AZINI. The fatality line is still 25, on Velos Sapphire, not on this PDF. NAVAREA IX now lists 433/26 as the 070300 UTC 7 November self-cancelling in-force list ending the 2026 series at 427, 428, 431 and 432 — wrap, unused as dedicated. 432/26 remains last night’s dedicated Southern Gulf container through 082359 UTC 8 November. No Warning 198-26, no 199-26, no Update 112, no IMO 130, no 434/26 and no NAVWARN 813 this run. Official MSCIO alerts index showed no numbered wrap against the TBC Khor Fakkan clock.
Operational implications
For a master already shaping a Fujairah, Khor Fakkan, Sohar, Musandam, Hormuz inbound or Gulf of Oman coastal transit, or holding in the Southern Gulf this evening, Saturday night is a numbered military-interaction Advisory on a TBC bulk-carrier clock, posted on 7 November, on top of last night’s dedicated 197-26 Khasab tanker Attack, on top of Thursday morning’s dedicated 196-26 Qatar tanker, and on top of Friday morning’s dedicated 431/26 Fujairah harbour survey. Update 111 remains the last numbered JMIC note and still prints Hormuz SEVERE, Arabian Gulf SUBSTANTIAL and Gulf of Oman MODERATE, with an ICOD that closed before this clock. 016-26 remains the working blockade document pack for hulls that still need the Strait. 198-26 adds a bulk carrier that had already been reported in an incident with military forces 18 nautical miles east of Khor Fakkan on 7 November, with crew, damage and environment unknown when the PDF was posted. A passage plan that only carried 197-26’s 2200 UTC Khasab tanker, or that treated Saturday as closed because 197-26 was the last UKMTO number at 11:30 UTC, has not budgeted a TBC Advisory on the UAE east-coast / western Gulf of Oman face.
An incident involving a bulk carrier and military forces, learned from military authorities, with crew, damage and environment unknown and the incident time still TBC, is a Channel 16, AIS-identity and reporting problem before it is a war-risk rewrite. 198-26 is not 197-26’s waterline-explosion, crew-safe, own-power problem. It is not 187-26’s alongside, slow-speed, above-waterline device problem. It is a hail, nationality, document and CPA problem at the same time as it is an open-status problem. Earlier military-interaction Advisories in this campaign, including 163-26, sat beside blockade-enforcement activity in the Gulf of Oman: hails, warnings, and in Ocean Molica’s case a later CENTCOM naming of a precision-munition disablement. 198-26 does not reprint that mechanism. It does not name a blockade. It does not name a navy. A master who is hailed 18 nautical miles east of Khor Fakkan still has to answer promptly, keep the flag documents and AIS identity consistent, and report the contact to UKMTO and to the company, because the public tape will not tell the next ship whether Saturday’s incident was a query, an escort, a diversion or something else. Do not wait for a hull name before putting that drill on the night orders. BMP MS remains the working industry pack; 198-26 does not reprint it and does not order an armed team. It also does not authorise a master to treat every radar contact east of Khor Fakkan as a confirmed Attack, or to treat every AIS-on bulk carrier as Huda or Ocean Molica after the fact.
The missing hull, time, fire and damage-volume lines are the practical damage watch, not a completed all-clear. The public PDF says crew, damage assessment and environmental impact are unknown at time of report. Those are status sentences. They are not a class survey, and they are not a finding that the hull is undamaged. Next-port authorities will want a written account that 198-26 does not contain. Charterers and war-risk underwriters will now ask whether the ship was 18 nautical miles east of Khor Fakkan on 7 November, whether it was a bulk carrier rather than a tanker, and whether it was following Update 111 and 016-26. They will not be answered by last night’s 197-26 Khasab Attack, by IMO’s Velos Sapphire row, by CENTCOM’s Huda statement as a substitute for the PDF, or by a NAVAREA that names a jack-up inside Port of Fujairah.
For a DPA and an operator with any merchant hull still using Fujairah, Khor Fakkan, Sohar, Musandam, Hormuz or the Gulf of Oman, the reporting split is the operational content. Sightings of explosions, fire, smoke, a disabled bulk carrier, a Mayday on Channel 16 or pollution go to UKMTO on the 198-26 action line and to the company security officer. NAVCENT NCAGS remains the 016-26 blockade mailbox for hulls that still need the Strait. MSCIO remains the EU ATALANTA registration and alert desk; no numbered MSCIO wrap against the TBC Khor Fakkan clock was retrieved this run. Registering with one mailbox is not a substitute for the others. 198-26 does not order a daylight-only transit, a deviation around a published circle, or a halt to visit-and-search compliance. Keep Update 111 Hormuz SEVERE / Arabian Gulf SUBSTANTIAL / Gulf of Oman MODERATE and 016-26 visit-and-search in the master’s pack. Watch a PDF revision that names a hull, prints a type beyond bulk carrier, a UTC clock, a NUC, a tow, a fire, a flooding line, a casualty line or a next-port line; a NAVAREA that plots this bulk carrier rather than SKATE 3D, Selat Storm, RITI or Louise 1; a flag or class note; a JMIC Update 112; or an IMO-board row — not a headline that CENTCOM closed Saturday’s Advisory or completed a salvage.
Keep the dedicated files on their own lines. 197-26 remains last night’s dedicated Master Attack on a tanker 16 nautical miles east of Khasab, explosion at the waterline port side, crew safe, under own power. 196-26 remains Thursday morning’s dedicated Verified Attack on a tanker 50 nautical miles north of Madinat ash Shamal, two unidentified projectiles, crew unconfirmed; Friday afternoon’s dedicated IMO 129-count remains the Velos Sapphire fatality conversion on that Qatar sheet, wrap, not a 198-26 hull. 195-26 remains Tuesday night’s dedicated CSO Attack on a tanker 14 nautical miles northeast of Lima. 178-26 remains 21 October’s dedicated Duqm tanker-and-military-forces Advisory. 163-26 remains the dedicated 11 October Gulf of Oman Advisory later named against Ocean Molica. 177-26 remains the dedicated Khor Fakkan tug Attack. 431/26 remains Friday morning’s dedicated Fujairah SKATE 3D harbour survey through 132359 UTC 13 November. 432/26 remains last night’s dedicated Southern Gulf container through 082359 UTC 8 November. Update 111 remains ICOD 051300 UTC, 172 incidents, six counted since the last report through 196-26. 016-26 remains the blockade document pack. This afternoon’s dedicated 799/26 remains the Varna port-and-road windows on 10 and 13 November. This afternoon’s dedicated 1411/26 remains the Abeille Marengo 2 NM cable track through 6 March. Do not recast 7 November night as a named Khor Fakkan bulk carrier, as 197-26 recast, as Ocean Molica filed twice, as Update 112, or as IMO moving the fatality line off Velos Sapphire.
What Operators Should Note
- Log 198-26 as a 7 November Khor Fakkan bulk-carrier Advisory on a TBC military-authorities clock, not as a 197-26 rewrite and not as an Ocean Molica rewrite. UKMTO Advisory 198-26, report date 7 November 2026, incident time TBC, source Military authorities. Filename
20261107-ukmto_advisory-198-26.pdf. Bulk carrier and military forces in the Gulf of Oman, approximately 18 nautical miles east of Khor Fakkan, UAE. Status of crew, damage assessment and environmental impact unknown at time of report. Authorities aware. Investigations ongoing. Consider the latest maritime security information. Maintain awareness of the evolving operational environment. Report to UKMTO, [email protected] / +44 (0) 2392 222060. Location footer Khor Fakkan, UAE. UKMTO printed neither hull, IMO, flag, cargo, service, munition, boarding, fire, lat/long beyond the 18-nautical-mile offset, anchorage, NUC, tow, next port, nor a keep-clear radius. This is not 197-26, not 178-26, not 163-26 / Ocean Molica, not 177-26, and not 431/26. - Hold the product type, the clock and the water. 198-26 is Advisory, not Attack and not Suspicious Activity. The working report date is 7 November. The working incident time is TBC, not 2200 UTC and not 2320 UTC. The working source is Military authorities, not Master and not Verified. The working type is bulk carrier, not tanker. The working water is the Gulf of Oman, approximately 18 nautical miles east of Khor Fakkan, UAE. The working method is an incident involving military forces — not a waterline explosion and not two unidentified projectiles. The crew, damage and environment lines are unknown at time of report, not “safe and accounted for.” The product number is 198. UKMTO’s Attack series still ends at dedicated 197-26. Do not brief Saturday night as “197-26’s Khasab tanker, now off Khor Fakkan.” Do not treat the 7 November filename as a completed UTC strike time.
- Hold CENTCOM / wire colour separately. CENTCOM’s 7 November statement named St. Kitts-and-Nevis-flagged M/V Huda and asserted a precision-munition disablement in the Gulf of Oman after repeated warnings. Anadolu Agency and Maritime Executive restated that release. Arab News, Reuters and Iran International restated the public UKMTO sentences without naming the hull on the Advisory. Treat the Huda naming, the munition, the blockade finding and the disablement as colour of a national statement, not as a 198-26 PDF fact. Do not promote Huda, IMO, St. Kitts and Nevis, stern, or “disabled” onto a product that still prints bulk carrier, unknown status and TBC. No numbered MSCIO wrap against the TBC clock was retrieved this run.
- Do not collapse 197-26, 178-26, 163-26 / Ocean Molica or 431/26 onto this number. 197-26 remains last night’s dedicated Master Attack on a tanker 16 nautical miles east of Khasab, explosion at the waterline port side, crew safe, under own power. 178-26 remains 21 October’s dedicated Duqm tanker-and-military-forces Advisory, 121 nautical miles east of Duqm, Arabian Sea. 163-26 remains the dedicated 11 October Gulf of Oman Advisory later named against Ocean Molica. 431/26 remains Friday morning’s dedicated SKATE 3D harbour survey inside Port of Fujairah through 132359 UTC 13 November. 177-26 remains the dedicated Khor Fakkan tug Attack. An 18-nautical-mile east-of-Khor-Fakkan bulk-carrier Advisory is not a 16-nautical-mile east-of-Khasab tanker Attack, and it is not a Fujairah jack-up. Five products are five products. A Khor Fakkan bulk carrier is a sixth overnight file. Do not make them one hull.
- Do not merge this watch onto 196-26 / Velos Sapphire, 195-26, 194-26 or IMO’s 129-count as a completed 198-26 naming. 196-26 remains Thursday morning’s dedicated Verified Attack on a tanker 50 nautical miles north of Madinat ash Shamal; Friday afternoon’s dedicated IMO 129-count remains the Velos Sapphire fatality conversion on that Qatar sheet. 195-26 remains Tuesday night’s dedicated CSO Attack on a tanker 14 nautical miles northeast of Lima. 194-26 remains Tuesday night’s dedicated Verified Attack on an Indian crewed dhow; Monday afternoon’s dedicated Al Jusufi file remains wrap on that number, not on 198-26. IMO still prints 129 confirmed / 25 dead as at 6 November, with VELOS SAPPHIRE as the named top row. IMO has not named 198-26. Fatality still 25, on Velos Sapphire. Update 111 remains ICOD 051300 UTC; this 7 November Advisory sits after that cut-off. 016-26 remains the blockade document pack. NAVAREA IX 433/26 remains the self-cancelling in-force list, unused as dedicated. No Update 112, no Warning 198-26, no IMO 130 this run.
- Treat the missing hull, time, fire and damage-volume lines as open damage lines. The public tape prints bulk carrier, military forces, Gulf of Oman, 18 nautical miles east of Khor Fakkan, crew / damage / environment unknown, incident time TBC. It does not print a hull, a cargo grade, a fire, a survey, a hole size, a NUC interval, a tug, a next-port name or a class note. Keep Update 111 Hormuz SEVERE / Arabian Gulf SUBSTANTIAL / Gulf of Oman MODERATE and 016-26 visit-and-search in the master’s pack. Put Channel 16, AIS identity and flag papers on the night orders for the Fujairah–Khor Fakkan–Sohar lane. Sightings go to UKMTO, MSCIO, the UAE and Omani authorities and the CSO. Watch a PDF revision that names a hull or prints a UTC clock; a NAVAREA that plots this bulk carrier rather than SKATE 3D; a flag or class note; a JMIC Update 112; or an IMO-board row — not a headline that CENTCOM closed Saturday’s Advisory or completed a salvage.
Regulas Shipping will keep lining Advisory 198-26 against last night’s dedicated Warning 197-26 and against 21 October’s dedicated Advisory 178-26 so operators can treat Saturday night’s tape as a numbered bulk-carrier-and-military-forces Advisory 18 nautical miles east of Khor Fakkan, not as a Khasab Attack rewrite, an Ocean Molica reprint, or a completed class survey.
