The European Union Naval Force ATALANTA Maritime Security Centre — Indian Ocean published Alert 161/26 as a numbered piracy product on its public alerts board. The page retrieved from mscio.eu/alerts/197 is titled Piracy and is timestamped 31 October 2026, 9:24 a.m. MSCIO states that it has received information regarding the reported hijacking of the Iranian fishing vessel AZINI on 29 October 2026, at approximately 09:00 UTC, off the northeastern Somali coast. The last reported position of the vessel was 09°42′N 053°55′E, at 04:00 UTC on 30 October 2026. The vessel was reportedly hijacked by armed pirates. The safety of the crew remains unknown. The vessel could potentially be used as a mothership to conduct further piracy attacks. Operation ATALANTA is investigating the reported incident. Vessels operating in the area are advised to maintain heightened vigilance, adhere to BMP-MS, and report immediately any suspicious activity or relevant information to MSCIO. Update 01 on the same page reprints the alert number and the Piracy family and states that the latest reported position of AZINI is 09°47′N 055°45′E, approaching the maritime traffic lane. AZINI could potentially be used as a mothership to conduct further piracy attacks. Operation ATALANTA continues to investigate. Emergency contacts printed on the product remain +33 (0)298 220 220, +33 (0)298 220 170 and [email protected].
That is the working primary. Sunday morning’s product is an official MSCIO piracy alert retrieved from mscio.eu, not a UKMTO PDF and not a NAVAREA IX keep-clear. It names a fishing-vessel hull. It names a flag as Iranian. It names a hijack clock. It names two successive positions. It names armed pirates. It leaves the crew unknown. It prints a mothership-potential sentence twice, once on the first report and once on Update 01. It does not name a merchant target, an IMO number, a call sign, a crew count, a weapon inventory on AZINI, a keep-clear radius, a disruption, or a corridor closure. Saturday night’s dedicated UKMTO Warning 190-26 piece on this desk, published about 23:34 UTC, still told operators that UKMTO had printed a large fishing vessel boarded by unauthorised personnel and a Pirate Action Group concern, and that the public PDF named neither hull nor lat/long. 161/26 was not on that board when that note was written. Masters who brief Sunday as a rewrite of 190-26, as a move of Wednesday’s 12-42N 047-35E keep-clear, as unused 186-26 finally named, or as Update 110 will have merged a named Somali-Basin hijack into four other series.
What the alert actually printed
The confirmed tape is the body of Alert 161/26 plus Update 01 on the same page. MSCIO has received information regarding the reported hijacking of the Iranian fishing vessel AZINI on 29 October 2026, at approximately 09:00 UTC, off the northeastern Somali coast. Last reported position 09°42′N 053°55′E at 04:00 UTC on 30 October 2026. Reportedly hijacked by armed pirates. Crew safety unknown. The vessel could potentially be used as a mothership to conduct further piracy attacks. Operation ATALANTA is investigating. Heightened vigilance. Adhere to BMP-MS. Report immediately to MSCIO. Update 01: latest reported position 09°47′N 055°45′E, approaching the maritime traffic lane. Mothership potential restated. Operation ATALANTA continues to investigate. That is the product. Stay with that wording. Do not invent an IMO number. Do not invent a call sign or an MMSI. Do not invent a crew count, a casualty table, or a released-crew line. Do not invent a skiff colour, a ladder count, a hook, or a person count. Those details sit on Wednesday night’s dedicated Advisory 184-26. They do not sit on 161/26. Do not invent a keep-clear radius around Bosaso, Socotra, Aden or Fujairah. The alert does not print one. Do not invent a fire line, a projectile line, or an environmental-impact line. Those sentences sit on late-October Hormuz products. They do not sit on 161/26.
The product type is the first briefing fact. 161/26 is Piracy, with Update 01 still in the Piracy family, not the Suspicious Activity family that ran Saturday night’s dedicated 190-26 and Thursday morning’s dedicated 185-26, not the Attack family that ran 187-26, 188-26 and 189-26, and not the Advisory family that ran 184-26. MSCIO says a named Iranian fishing vessel was hijacked by armed pirates off the northeastern Somali coast and that the hull could potentially be used as a mothership. It does not say a merchant vessel was boarded. It does not say a projectile struck a tanker. It does not say the fishing vessel is at anchor, NUC, under tow, sunk or on fire. A DPA who briefs Sunday as “another Hormuz Attack, crew safe” has borrowed 187-26’s all-clear lines and has dropped the named hijack that is the whole of this alert. A DPA who briefs Sunday as a completed PAG disruption because 184-26 already printed ladders and a hook has under-read a numbered piracy product that still withholds a merchant target and a disruption line.
The two clocks and the two positions are the second briefing fact. The hijack sits on a Thursday 09:00 UTC northeastern-Somali clock. The first position sits on a Friday 04:00 UTC report at 09-42N 053-55E. Update 01 sits on a Saturday morning page and moves the hull to 09-47N 055-45E, approaching the maritime traffic lane. That is a named eastward displacement of about one hundred nautical miles between the Friday 04:00 UTC fix and the Update 01 fix, not a teleport and not a second hijack. Channel 16, the MSCIO emergency line, the UKMTO emergency line and the company duty officer still have to be on the night orders for any hull working the Voluntary Reporting Area, the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor, the Somali Basin, or the Gulf of Aden approaches. Do not treat “Iranian fishing vessel” as a merchant naming. Do not treat “could potentially be used as a mothership” as a confirmed mothership already launching attacks. Do not treat “approaching the maritime traffic lane” as a published IRTC deviation order or as a closed geographic file. The alert does not order ships off a lane. It does not print a circle around 09-47N 055-45E.
BMP-MS on the action line is Best Management Practices for Maritime Security, the current industry booklet, not a new circular. 161/26 tells ships in the area to maintain heightened vigilance, adhere to BMP-MS, and report immediately to MSCIO. It does not reprint citadel, hardening, AIS or Voluntary Reporting Area procedures. It does not order an armed team. MSCIO emergency reporting remains the postmaster mailbox and the two Brest numbers on the page. UKMTO remains [email protected] and +44 (0)2392222060. Those are different desks. 161/26 does not merge them. Saturday night’s dedicated 190-26 still told operators to report to UKMTO. Sunday morning’s official MSCIO product tells operators to report to MSCIO. Registering with one mailbox is not a substitute for the other.
Industry colour of the same clock, held separately: Clearwater Dynamics restated the MSCIO hijack, printed AZINI as Iranian-flagged, and carried an Update line. That reprint is not a naming beyond the official page and is not a UKMTO PDF. Treat it as industry colour of the public MSCIO alert. Do not collapse it onto 190-26 as a completed identification of Saturday night’s unnamed fishing vessel. The public UKMTO PDF as retrieved still does not print AZINI, 09-42N 053-55E or 09-47N 055-45E. Do not promote a tracker card to a 190-26 location footer.
What this is not
This is not a rewrite of 190-26, and it is not a UKMTO hull naming. Saturday night’s dedicated Warning 190-26 remains an unnamed Suspicious Activity product, incident 30 October 2026, 1419 UTC, source Verified: large fishing vessel boarded by unauthorised personnel; authorities concerned this activity will form part of a Pirate Action Group; transit with caution; adopt all BMP measures; report to UKMTO. 190-26 printed neither hull, IMO, flag, mothership status, merchant target, lat/long, keep-clear radius nor a location footer on the public PDF as retrieved. 161/26 is MSCIO, Piracy, AZINI, Iranian, 29 October 09:00 UTC, two printed positions, armed pirates, crew unknown, mothership potential. 190-26 is UKMTO, Suspicious Activity, unnamed large fishing vessel, 30 October 1419 UTC, no position. Do not merge Friday afternoon’s unnamed boarding onto Thursday morning’s named hijack because both print a fishing vessel and a PAG or mothership concern. Do not convert 161/26’s AZINI into 190-26’s unnamed hull unless a later UKMTO PDF, flag note, class note, JMIC update or NAVAREA prints AZINI against the 1419 UTC clock. This desk has not retrieved that print.
This is not a rewrite of 184-26, and it is not a second Aden Advisory. Wednesday night’s dedicated Advisory 184-26 remains an unnamed PAG watch, 1030 UTC 28 October, source Military authorities, location footer Aden, Yemen: reports from various sources of suspicious activity within the Gulf of Aden, potentially indicative of Pirate Action Group Activity; several sightings of suspicious small craft near merchant vessels; one report a green and blue boat with two ladders and one hook with nine persons onboard; transit with caution; follow BMP MS; report to UKMTO. 184-26 is Advisory. 161/26 is Piracy. 184-26 is 28 October, 1030 UTC, Aden. 161/26 is 29 October, 09:00 UTC, northeastern Somali coast, then 09-42N 053-55E and 09-47N 055-45E. 184-26 prints small-craft sightings. 161/26 prints a named hijacked fishing vessel. Do not merge Wednesday’s sighting watch onto Thursday’s hijack because both print PAG or mothership language. Do not convert AZINI onto the nine-person green-and-blue boat.
This is not a rewrite of NAVAREA IX 416/26, and it is not a move of 12-42N 047-35E. 416/26, issued 281500 UTC 28 October and wrapped on Wednesday night’s 184-26, remains the working keep-clear: Gulf of Aden / Somalia, possible pirate action group approximately 12-42N 047-35E, keep clear of this position, extreme caution, report incidents, cancel 032359 UTC 3 November 2026. That NAVAREA is still in force this morning. 161/26 does not reprint 12-42N 047-35E. It does not extend the cancel. It does not add a radius. The Update 01 traffic-lane sentence is not a coordinator revision of 416/26. A DPA who briefs Sunday as “the Aden keep-clear moved east to 09-47N 055-45E” has invented a Pakistan-table amendment the Sunday in-force list does not print. NAVAREA IX still ends, on that table, at 423/26 as an in-force list.
This is not a rewrite of MSCIO Alert 160/26, and it is not a rewrite of Alert 156/26. Official MSCIO Alert 160/26, retrieved from mscio.eu/alerts/196, remains a separate Suspicious Activity product, 30 October 2026, 9:10 a.m. page, incident about 02:25 UTC on 30 October near 11°57.4′N 045°04.5′E in the Gulf of Aden: merchant vessel approached by two suspicious craft, including a greenish fast skiff with four persons and a mounted machine gun, closed to about 300 metres astern, aborted after the vessel’s armed security team displayed their weapons, no shots, no boarding, vessel continued, Operation ATALANTA investigating. That is wrap on this desk this morning, not a second dedicated hijack and not a naming of AZINI. Official MSCIO Alert 156/26, already treated as colour on Wednesday night’s 184-26 piece and now retrieved from mscio.eu/alerts/192, remains the 12°42′N 047°35′E green-blue nine-person PAG sighting. Three MSCIO numbers are three products. Do not make them one mothership.
This is not a rewrite of 189-26, 188-26, 187-26 or unused 186-26. Saturday morning’s dedicated Warning 189-26 remains a time-late Attack: crude oil tanker, unknown projectile, outbound Strait of Hormuz, 28 October, time TBC, source Verified. Friday evening’s dedicated Warning 188-26 remains an unnamed vessel Attack, 1800 UTC 30 October, 40 nautical miles south of Lavan Island, port-side projectile, fire, crew reported safe. Friday morning’s dedicated Warning 187-26 Update 001 remains an unnamed outbound tanker Attack, 2212 UTC 29 October, 25 nautical miles northeast of Khasab, two explosive devices attached above the waterline, engine-room fire extinguished, continuing. Thursday afternoon’s unused Warning 186-26 remains a CSO Attack: tanker struck by an unknown projectile at 1600 UTC 29 October whilst completing an outbound Hormuz transit, no reported injuries, no environmental impact report, location footer Khasab, Oman. 161/26 prints AZINI, a fishing vessel, a hijack, armed pirates, two Somali-Basin positions. A projectile, a fire, a crude-oil tanker and a Lavan offset are not a named fishing-vessel hijack. Do not convert 161/26 onto those Attacks as a late naming.
This is not Update 110, and it is not an International Maritime Organization 123-count. JMIC Update 109, JMIC# 001 26, ICOD 291300 UTC 29 October, remains the last numbered public periodic note, with Hormuz SEVERE, the Arabian Gulf SUBSTANTIAL, the Gulf of Oman MODERATE, the Gulf of Aden SUBSTANTIAL and 160 incidents since 1 March. Update 109’s last 96-hour list ends at 185-26. 186-26, 187-26, 188-26, 189-26, 190-26, 420/26 and now 161/26 all sit off that list as published. They are not a completed Update 110. Wednesday afternoon’s dedicated JMIC Advisory Note 016-26 remains the blockade visit-and-search document pack. Saturday afternoon’s dedicated IMO highlighted-incidents board remains 122 confirmed / 24 seafarer fatalities as at 30 October, with Ghana Prosperity’s second Strait row as the newest named line. A Somali-Basin fishing-vessel hijack does not fill those slots and does not belong on that Middle East highlighted-incidents table. This is not Thursday’s dedicated Contship Jet or Khoryv Black Sea files, and it is not Saturday’s dedicated NAVWARN 776/26 Galata diving box or 777/26 Burgas cutter. Those are Kaliakra, Shabla, Varna and Burgas products. They do not belong on a Somali-Basin piracy alert.
This is not a confirmed merchant hijack, a completed mothership finding, or a corridor closure. 161/26 prints a named fishing vessel hijacked by armed pirates and a twice-printed concern that the hull could potentially be used as a mothership. It does not print Asana. Update 108 still carried Asana as hijacked on the unused periodic note that Update 109 later replaced; 161/26 does not move that hull and does not close that case. It does not print a IRTC deviation, a daylight-only order, or an armed-team instruction. Do not promote a mothership-potential sentence to a completed disruption or to a named merchant target.
Operational implications
For a master already in the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor, shaping the Voluntary Reporting Area overnight, or holding on a Gulf of Aden, Guardafui or eastern-Somali-Basin approach, Sunday morning is a bridge-and-lookout problem before it is a policy problem. MSCIO printed a named Iranian fishing vessel hijacked on Thursday morning, printed a Friday 04:00 UTC fix at 09-42N 053-55E, and then printed an Update 01 fix at 09-47N 055-45E approaching the maritime traffic lane. A boarded or hijacked fishing vessel is a classic mothership watch: the hull itself may loiter, may close a merchant track, or may launch or recover small craft. The product still stops at “could potentially be used as a mothership.” The working instruction is heightened vigilance, BMP-MS, and an immediate report to MSCIO, not a deviation around a published circle. 416/26 still gives the earlier Aden watch a plot to keep clear of through 032359 UTC 3 November: 12-42N 047-35E. That plot is not 161/26’s plot. A passage plan that only carried Wednesday’s Advisory, or that treated the corridor as quiet because 190-26 printed a boarding without a position, has not budgeted a named hull now printed about one hundred nautical miles east of its Friday fix and on a traffic-lane approach.
For a DPA and an operator with ships in the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea approaches, the Somali Basin or the Arabian Sea this week, the reporting split is the operational content. Sightings of AZINI, of a fishing vessel under unauthorised control near 09-47N 055-45E, of small craft working from such a hull, of ladders, hooks or a close CPA go to MSCIO on the 161/26 action line, to UKMTO on the standing 190-26 and 184-26 lines, and to the company security officer. Registering with one mailbox is not a substitute for the other. NAVCENT NCAGS remains the 016-26 blockade mailbox for hulls that still need the Strait. 161/26 does not order a daylight-only transit, a deviation around 12-42N 047-35E beyond the existing 416/26 keep-clear, or a halt to visit-and-search compliance. It also does not authorise a master to treat every Iranian fishing vessel in the Voluntary Reporting Area as a confirmed PAG after the fact. Log the alert number, the 29 October hijack date, the 09:00 UTC clock, the Iranian fishing-vessel type, the name AZINI, the armed-pirates method, the unknown-crew line, the two positions, the mothership-potential sentence, the traffic-lane approach, and the BMP-MS action line. Do not log Aden, 12-42N 047-35E, a green-and-blue nine-person skiff, RITI, Louise 1, Ghana Prosperity, a Hormuz projectile, or a 190-26 naming that the UKMTO PDF does not print.
The eastward move is the routing change the first paragraph could not yet give. 09-42N 053-55E sits off the northeastern Somali coast. 09-47N 055-45E sits about one hundred nautical miles further east, on the sentence MSCIO used: approaching the maritime traffic lane. That is a working track, not a charted wreck and not a published exclusion. A hull that has already made good that much easting between a Friday 04:00 UTC fix and a Saturday Update 01 can be elsewhere again by a Sunday morning passage. Plot both printed positions. Keep a lookout up-track and down-track. Do not leave the Friday 09-42N 053-55E waypoint as the only AZINI in the folder. Do not invent a keep-clear radius that the alert does not print. Do not invent an IRTC closure because Update 01 used the words “maritime traffic lane.”
BMP hardening, citadel drills, AIS and lighting policy, and the decision to keep or drop a privately contracted armed security team stay company and flag business. 161/26 does not order a team on, a team off, a speed change, or a corridor closure. Charterers, P&I and war-risk underwriters will now ask whether the ship was in the Voluntary Reporting Area after 09:00 UTC Thursday, whether it was near 09-47N 055-45E after Update 01, whether it reported to MSCIO, and whether it was following BMP-MS. They will not be answered by Saturday morning’s 189-26 Hormuz Attack, by Friday night’s 188-26 Lavan Attack, by Saturday afternoon’s IMO 122-count, or by Saturday night’s unnamed 190-26 boarding. Off-hire and deviation conversations that treat 161/26 as a Hormuz fixture problem have misread the product type and the basin.
The missing merchant-target, crew and disruption lines are the practical watch, not a completed all-clear. The official tape says the crew remains unknown. It does not say whether AZINI is making way under the boarders’ control, whether small craft have left it, or whether a merchant ship was approached after the Update 01 fix. Those missing lines are omissions. They are not a completed “all well,” and they are not a confirmed merchant hijack. Next-port authorities will want a written account that 161/26 does not contain. Keep Update 109’s Gulf of Aden SUBSTANTIAL / Gulf of Oman MODERATE / Hormuz SEVERE lines and 016-26 visit-and-search in the master’s pack. Watch an MSCIO Update 02 that moves 09-47N 055-45E, names a merchant target, prints a crew line or a disruption; a UKMTO PDF that prints AZINI against 190-26; a NAVAREA that plots this fishing vessel rather than 12-42N 047-35E; a flag or class note; or a JMIC Update 110 — not a headline that Sunday morning closed Wednesday’s Aden file or completed a PAG disruption.
Keep the dedicated files on their own lines. 190-26 remains Saturday night’s unnamed Suspicious Activity fishing-vessel boarding with a PAG concern. 184-26 / 416/26 remains the Gulf of Aden PAG keep-clear through 3 November. 160/26 remains this morning’s official MSCIO Gulf of Aden skiff-approach wrap, 11-57.4N 045-04.5E, not this hull. 189-26 remains Saturday morning’s unnamed time-late Hormuz crude-oil-tanker Attack. 188-26 remains Friday night’s unnamed vessel Attack 40 nautical miles south of Lavan Island. 187-26 remains Friday morning’s unnamed outbound-tanker Attack 25 nautical miles northeast of Khasab. 186-26 remains the unused 1600 UTC unknown-projectile Attack. 185-26 remains Thursday’s 9-nautical-mile north-of-Khasab fire sighting. 183-26 remains the 26 October Al-Faw fire. 182-26 remains the 23 October outbound-Hormuz disablement, named Ghana Prosperity on Update 109 and on Saturday afternoon’s IMO 122-count as wrap, not as a 161/26 hull. 181-26 / Leonora Kosan remains Limah. 420/26 remains Friday night’s dedicated RITI fire-and-anchor. 417/26 remains Friday morning’s dedicated MSV Quba wreck. Update 109 remains the last periodic threat note. 016-26 remains Wednesday afternoon’s blockade document pack. Saturday’s dedicated 776/26 and 777/26 remain the Galata diving box and the Burgas cutter. 775/26 remains Saturday morning’s two-hour Bulgarian territorial-sea e-mail. Thursday’s 768/26 and 766/26 remain the Kaliakra and Shabla Black Sea files. Do not recast 1 November morning as a Hormuz Attack, as a 190-26 naming, as unused 186-26 finally published, as Update 110, as an IMO 123-count, or as a corridor closure.
What Operators Should Note
- Log 161/26 as a named fishing-vessel hijack with a mothership-potential line, not as a rewrite of 190-26 and not as an Attack. MSCIO Alert 161/26, Piracy, page timestamp 31 October 2026, 9:24 a.m., retrieved from
mscio.eu/alerts/197. Iranian fishing vessel AZINI, reported hijacked 29 October 2026 at approximately 09:00 UTC off the northeastern Somali coast. First printed position 09°42′N 053°55′E at 04:00 UTC 30 October. Armed pirates. Crew safety unknown. Potential mothership. Heightened vigilance. BMP-MS. Report immediately to MSCIO, [email protected] / +33 (0)298 220 220 and +33 (0)298 220 170. Update 01: 09°47′N 055°45′E, approaching the maritime traffic lane; mothership potential restated; Operation ATALANTA continues to investigate. MSCIO printed neither IMO, call sign, crew count, merchant target, keep-clear radius, disruption, nor a corridor closure. This is not 190-26, not 184-26, not 160/26, not 189-26, and not Update 109. - Hold the two clocks, the two positions and the product type. 161/26 is Piracy, not Suspicious Activity, not Attack and not Advisory. The working hijack date is 29 October. The working hijack time is approximately 09:00 UTC. The working first fix is 09-42N 053-55E at 04:00 UTC 30 October. The working Update 01 fix is 09-47N 055-45E, approaching the maritime traffic lane. The working hull is AZINI, Iranian fishing vessel, not a crude-oil tanker and not a green-and-blue skiff. The working method is hijacked by armed pirates, not an unknown projectile and not two attached devices. Do not brief Sunday as “Saturday night’s unnamed boarding, now named.” Do not brief Sunday as quiet because the alert withholds a merchant target.
- Hold 190-26 on its own line until a UKMTO PDF prints AZINI. Warning 190-26 remains the dedicated 1419 UTC 30 October unnamed large-fishing-vessel boarding with a PAG concern. It still prints no hull and no lat/long on the public PDF as retrieved. Do not promote 161/26 to a 190-26 naming. Do not promote 190-26 to a 09-47N 055-45E plot. Two fishing-vessel products are two products until an official series joins them.
- Hold 184-26 / 416/26 on their own line through 3 November, and hold 160/26 as wrap. Advisory 184-26 remains the dedicated 1030 UTC 28 October Gulf of Aden small-craft PAG watch, location footer Aden, Yemen. NAVAREA IX 416/26 remains the keep-clear at 12-42N 047-35E until 032359 UTC 3 November. Official MSCIO Alert 160/26 remains the 02:25 UTC 30 October Gulf of Aden skiff approach at 11-57.4N 045-04.5E, aborted after weapons display, no shots, no boarding. 161/26 does not reprint those plots, does not extend the 416/26 cancel, and does not add a radius. Do not move 12-42N 047-35E onto AZINI. Do not convert AZINI onto the nine-person green-and-blue boat or onto the four-person machine-gun skiff.
- Treat the unknown-crew and mothership-potential lines as open watch lines. The official tape does not print a crew-safe sentence, a merchant approach, a disruption, or a keep-clear. Plot 09-42N 053-55E and 09-47N 055-45E. Keep a lookout up-track and down-track. Do not invent an IRTC closure from the traffic-lane sentence. Keep Update 109 Gulf of Aden SUBSTANTIAL / Gulf of Oman MODERATE / Hormuz SEVERE and 016-26 visit-and-search in the master’s pack. Report to MSCIO and keep the UKMTO mailbox current. Watch an Update 02, a UKMTO PDF that prints AZINI, a NAVAREA that plots this fishing vessel, a flag or class note, or a JMIC Update 110 — not a headline that Sunday morning closed Wednesday’s Aden file or completed a PAG disruption.
- Do not collapse 189-26, 188-26, 187-26, 186-26 or 420/26 onto this number. 189-26 remains the dedicated time-late outbound-Hormuz crude-oil-tanker Attack. 188-26 remains the dedicated 1800 UTC unnamed vessel Attack 40 nautical miles south of Lavan Island. 187-26 remains the dedicated 2212 UTC attached-device Attack 25 nautical miles northeast of Khasab. 186-26 remains the unused 1600 UTC 29 October CSO unknown-projectile Attack, Khasab footer. 420/26 remains Friday night’s dedicated RITI fire-and-anchor at 26-24.07N 056-24.72E. Five late-October Hormuz products are five products. They are not a Somali-Basin fishing vessel.
Regulas Shipping will keep lining Alert 161/26 and Update 01 against Saturday night’s dedicated Warning 190-26 and against NAVAREA IX 416/26’s 3 November keep-clear so operators can treat Sunday morning’s tape as a named Iranian fishing-vessel hijack with a mothership-potential line and two printed positions, not as a Hormuz Attack, a 190-26 naming, or a completed disruption.
