Yemen’s Houthi movement said on Wednesday, 23 September, that 408 commercial vessels had transited the Bab el-Mandeb Strait between 11 and 21 September. The statement, aired on Houthi-run al-Masirah television and carried by the group-run Saba news agency, split the count as 196 ships heading north toward the Red Sea and 212 heading south toward the Gulf of Aden. The group said daily traffic averaged more than 40 commercial vessels, including container ships, and that international shipping was proceeding “normally and safely,” except for Saudi vessels, which it said remain under a maritime ban. It added that the latest figure exceeded the 393 commercial vessels it recorded between 1 and 10 September (199 north, 194 south).
Those numbers have not been independently verified. Ship-tracking firms that publish daily Bab el-Mandeb commodity counts have been printing a different picture: Reuters, citing Kpler, put Monday, 21 September, at 26 commodity vessels, unchanged from Sunday, and Tuesday, 22 September, at 22 (14 toward the Red Sea, eight toward the Gulf of Aden), against a 10-day average of about 26. That Tuesday mix included five Panamax tankers, six Supramax vessels, four Aframax tankers, a Suezmax and a VLCC. Pre-crisis Bab el-Mandeb traffic was on the order of 70 vessels a day in some tracker series. A Houthi claim of “more than 40 a day” and “normal and safe” is therefore a political traffic statement, not a substitute for Kpler, Lloyd’s List Intelligence or a master’s own passage plan.
Incident context
The Wednesday count covers the first 11 days after Houthi forces seized the Red Sea port of Mokha (Mocha) on 10 September and Mayyun (Perim) Island in the strait on 11 September. Greater and Lesser Hanish and the rest of the Yemeni Red Sea coast were reported taken in the same week. The group’s targeting rule has not changed: Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi / military spokesman Yahya Saree language since the July Saudi-ship ban has been that traffic is “safe except Saudi.” The United Nations Security Council’s 15-member statement on the night of 18 September condemned Houthi attacks and threats against commercial shipping in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb, demanded that the escalation stop, and recalled the arms embargo under resolution 2216. That statement did not reopen a corridor and did not adopt the Houthi traffic figures.
Independent monthly and weekly series already on the public record sit well below a 40-ship daily claim if the comparison is commodity vessels. Lloyd’s List Intelligence’s 18 September Red Sea brief put August Bab el-Mandeb throughput at 1,166 transits and 92.7 million dwt — up 6 percent year-on-year, but down 14 percent month-on-month in transits and 19 percent in dwt, and still about 49 percent below 2023. Suez Canal August transits were 1,232 ships and 102.4 million dwt, the busiest month since December 2023 and still about 39 percent below pre-crisis. Kpler’s Ampatzidis had recently described daily Bab el-Mandeb commodity traffic in a 26–35 range after an earlier 35–40 band. A separate Kpler cut after the Mokha–Mayyun week put only five laden vessels carrying Saudi products out of the Red Sea through the strait in seven days, with crude on the route around 3.4 million barrels a day against a 2026 year-to-date average near 4.4 million. Lloyd’s had earlier noted only one Saudi-linked tanker through Bab el-Mandeb since 20 July.
Methodology matters. The Houthi 408 figure is a group-supplied total for “commercial vessels,” including container ships, over 11 days (about 37 a day if the arithmetic is taken at face value, or “more than 40” in the group’s own wording). Kpler’s daily Reuters prints are commodity-vessel snapshots, typically tankers and dry bulk, taken at a fixed time and revised as AIS updates. The two series are not the same census. Operators can hold both facts at once: some box ships have gone back to Suez and Bab el-Mandeb in August and September, and the waterway is not empty — and the same waterway is still a listed, selective-risk strait whose coastal state on the Yemeni side is now held by the force that has been attacking ships.
Europe’s protective layer has not caught up with that coastal change. EU foreign-policy chief Kaja Kallas told reporters in New York on Monday, 21 September, that Operation Aspides had been sized for at least 10 warships and that “the situation is even more grave right now.” Diplomats have said about six Aspides hulls are operating. Kallas’s 19 September letter to the EU-27 asked for more naval and air assets ahead of defence and foreign-ministers meetings. Italy has separately been preparing a national escort through Bab el-Mandeb rather than waiting for Aspides. None of those moves is a general-traffic lane, and none of them adopts the Houthi “normal and safe” line.
Operational implications
For owners deciding whether to keep a ship on Suez or send it around the Cape, Wednesday’s Houthi statement is a targeting and communications product, not a hydrographic or insurance all-clear. “Safe except Saudi” is a political exclusion, not a flag-state or class warranty. Hulls with a recent Saudi load, discharge, ownership, management or AIS history that can be read as Saudi-linked remain the explicit exception in the group’s own text. Charterers moving Saudi crude, products or boxes should not treat a 408-ship headline as evidence that the July ban has lapsed. The five-laden-Saudi-product-vessels-in-a-week Kpler cut is the more useful planning number for that subset.
Container lines that have put selected loops back through Suez — MSC’s westbound Indusa from 23 September, Gemini’s AE5/AE11/AE12/ME2 moves, COSCO’s first southbound OOCL Portugal — are still running a case-by-case security process. Sea-Intelligence’s September read had more than 25 percent of Asia–Europe capacity back on the Red Sea, with Asia–Mediterranean headhaul around 35 percent and backhaul 50–60 percent, and Asia–North Europe still much lower on the headhaul. Spot rates have eased as that capacity has returned. That commercial recovery can coexist with a coastal takeover at Mokha and Mayyun. A 408-ship Houthi count, even if it includes every box ship the group saw on AIS, does not tell a master whether Aspides or a national escort will be on his track, whether a Saudi-linked tanker is in the same TSS, or whether a Houthi battery on Mayyun has a different target set tomorrow.
War-risk, ISPS and crew-nationality limits do not reset on a Houthi press statement. Liberia’s ISPS Level 3 for the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden remains in force. Joint War Committee listed-area language for the Red Sea / Gulf of Aden theatre is unchanged by Wednesday’s figures. Italy’s national-escort planning and Kallas’s request for more than 10 Aspides ships are reminders that European protection is still rationed: some flags and some commercial relationships will get a frigate, and many will not. Owners who are not Italian-flag or Italian-owned, and who are not on an Aspides tasking list, should not plan as if a 40-ship daily flow implies a covered transit.
The comparison with Hormuz is useful only as a caution. Hormuz visible commodity traffic has been in single digits on several recent days, with projectile hits continuing — including Wednesday’s Cape Dao casualty off Musandam. Bab el-Mandeb is busier than Hormuz on the Kpler prints. It is not a return to the pre-2023 Red Sea. August’s Lloyd’s dwt figures were still about half of 2023. Daily commodity counts in the low-to-mid 20s are a constrained corridor, not “normal.” Operators who brief Wednesday’s 408 figure to charterers without the Kpler and Lloyd’s caveats will be briefing a Houthi claim as if it were a traffic report.
What Operators Should Note
- Treat the 408-ship figure as a Houthi claim, not a verified daily census. Al-Masirah / Saba said 408 commercial vessels from 11 to 21 September, 196 north and 212 south, “more than 40” a day, safe except Saudi. Xinhua and Iran International both noted that the numbers could not be independently verified. Do not put 40-plus a day into a voyage memo as a Kpler print.
- Keep the Kpler commodity series next to the claim. Reuters had 26 Bab el-Mandeb commodity ships on Monday and 22 on Tuesday (14 Red Sea-bound, eight Gulf of Aden-bound) against a 10-day average of about 26. That is a different definition from a Houthi “commercial vessels including container ships” total. Use both, and say which is which.
- “Safe except Saudi” is still the targeting rule, not a lifted ban. The group’s own statement repeats the exception. Kpler’s recent week showed only five laden Saudi-product vessels exiting the Red Sea through the strait. Saudi-linked ownership, cargo, last-port and AIS history still need a separate go/no-go, not a share of the 408.
- Do not read Mokha and Mayyun as compatible with a normal TSS. The count starts the day after Mokha fell and includes the week Mayyun was taken. Coastal control of the strait by the force that has been attacking ships is an operational fact. It is not evidence that the waterway has been handed back to ordinary coastal-state management.
- Protection remains selective. Aspides is still described at about six warships against a stated need for more than 10. Italy is preparing a national escort for Italian-flag and Italian-owned ships. If you are not on those lists, a busy AIS picture does not mean you have cover. Liberia ISPS Level 3 for the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden still applies.
- Suez restorations are still case-by-case. Selected westbound loops and a first COSCO southbound transit do not convert Bab el-Mandeb into a default route. Keep Cape optionality, war-risk warranties and crew-consent language in the charter. Brief the master on Houthi VHF, UAV and coastal-battery risk even when the last daily commodity count was in the 20s.
- Do not merge this file with Hormuz diplomacy or with Wednesday’s Cape Dao casualty. A Houthi traffic statement is a Red Sea / Gulf of Aden product. It does not reopen Hormuz, and it does not reduce projectile risk at Musandam. Report and insure each theatre on its own warnings.
Regulas Shipping will keep monitoring Houthi statements against Kpler, Lloyd’s List Intelligence and official Red Sea warnings, and will update operators if an independent census confirms a sustained change in Bab el-Mandeb traffic or in the Saudi-linked targeting rule.
