{"id":849,"date":"2026-09-28T11:33:18","date_gmt":"2026-09-28T11:33:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/regulasshipping.com\/blog\/kallas-says-aspides-still-needs-more-ships-as-ministers-meet-with-no-new-hulls\/"},"modified":"2026-09-28T11:33:18","modified_gmt":"2026-09-28T11:33:18","slug":"kallas-says-aspides-still-needs-more-ships-as-ministers-meet-with-no-new-hulls","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/regulasshipping.com\/blog\/kallas-says-aspides-still-needs-more-ships-as-ministers-meet-with-no-new-hulls\/","title":{"rendered":"Kallas says Aspides still needs more ships as ministers meet with no new hulls"},"content":{"rendered":"

EU High Representative Kaja Kallas said on Monday, 28 September, as she arrived in Brussels for the Foreign Affairs Council at defence-ministers\u2019 level, that Operation Aspides still needs more naval assets and that the need is \u201cgreater than ever.\u201d Speaking to reporters before the meeting, she said she had urged member states to contribute more ships to the Red Sea mission and had received no new firm commitments. Kuwait\u2019s news agency, carried by Kuwait Times, quoted her noting numerous requests for vessel escorts. Iran International, timestamped 07:34 GMT+1, reported her as saying more ships were needed for Aspides \u201cto become operational.\u201d That doorstep is the primary for this note. It is not a rewrite of her 21 September United Nations line that the mission needed more than ten warships, of Italy\u2019s 18 September national-escort file, of Friday\u2019s Maersk 67 \/ CMA CGM 60 Suez counts, or of the Yanbu war-risk premium already on this blog.<\/p>\n

The meeting is the date Kallas pointed member states toward after Italian Defence Minister Guido Crosetto\u2019s 18 September letter and her own 19 September letter to the EU-27. Monday\u2019s public result, as of the arrival statements, is that the escort queue is still longer than the force. Diplomats have told Reuters that about six warships are operating with the mission. Kallas said last week that when Aspides was stood up the indication was at least ten ships and that \u201cthe situation, I think, is even more grave right now.\u201d Monday did not close that gap with named new hulls. Do not brief it as a Bab el-Mandeb clearance, a restored Suez container pattern, a listed-area change, or a European substitute for US cover in the Red Sea.<\/p>\n

The cover the mission can actually give is the constraint<\/h2>\n

EUNAVFOR Aspides was launched in February 2024 as a defensive maritime-security operation after Houthi attacks on merchant shipping. Its area of activity covers major routes around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and international waters in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman and the Gulf. The Council extended the mandate in February 2026 until 28 February 2027 after a strategic review and allocated nearly \u20ac15 million in common costs from 1 March 2026 through the end of that mandate. In March the Council also expanded the task list to include collecting and sharing information on suspicious activity related to critical submarine infrastructure, training Djiboutian maritime forces and cooperating with the Yemeni Coast Guard. Those extra tasks sit on the same hulls. They do not create extra escorts.<\/p>\n

Crosetto wrote to Kallas on 18 September calling for \u201cdecisive and extremely urgent\u201d contributions from other member states, according to Italian reporting of the letter. He said Aspides did not have enough assets to meet merchant requests for protection and warned that Italy could use naval assets already deployed under Aspides to escort Italian merchant ships through Bab el-Mandeb on a national basis, saying Rome \u201ccould not wait for EU bureaucracy.\u201d A Rome diplomatic source told Euractiv that a meaningful impact would require a dimension closer to double the current size. Kallas\u2019s 19 September letter, seen by Euractiv, said Houthi control of Mocha port, Perim Island (Mayyun) and the Hanish Islands had given the group greater leverage over Bab el-Mandeb, and that one conclusion was already known: \u201cWe need more and well-equipped naval and air assets,\u201d including more close-protection capacity. She asked capitals to propose possible actions ahead of the 28 September Foreign Affairs and Defence Council, including reinforcement of Aspides and Atalanta.<\/p>\n

Il Sole 24 Ore, writing on 26 September ahead of the meeting, said Greece is leading the operation, that Italy currently has one frigate in the region to which two minesweepers could be added, and that many partners are aware of the passage\u2019s importance but short of resources. A diplomat told the paper that, apart from resources, some governments have reassessed involvement after recent Houthi attacks. Belgium was reported as willing to make a ship available; France and the Netherlands were described as possible. Paris currently has two vessels in the region, typically stationed toward the Strait of Hormuz rather than as a standing Bab el-Mandeb escort. Those are pre-meeting reports of willingness, not Monday pledges. Kallas\u2019s arrival line is the one that can be used operationally: no new firm commitments, numerous escort requests, need greater than ever, and a mission she described as still short of what it takes to be operational.<\/p>\n

Operators should treat escort as rationed, not as a corridor<\/h2>\n

Houthi forces still hold Mocha, Mayyun and the Hanish Islands and the Yemeni Red Sea coast. Abdul-Malik al-Houthi\u2019s \u201csafe except Saudi\u201d targeting rule remains the published political line, not a traffic-management product. Independent commodity counts through Bab el-Mandeb have stayed well below the Houthi \u201cmore than 40 a day\u201d claim already examined on this blog. Dry bulk, certain products and a limited tanker set without Saudi affiliations are what still move; box lines that have returned some hulls to Suez are doing so on their own commercial calculus, not because Aspides can now cover a restored 80-a-week container canal. Maersk\u2019s September count of 67 ships and CMA CGM\u2019s 60, reported at the Suez Canal Authority meeting in Ismailia, sit beside that cover gap. They are not evidence that European close protection is available on demand.<\/p>\n

The operational implication is a booking problem, not a press-conference problem. A Master who files for an Aspides escort is competing for a force Kallas says is below the original ten-ship assessment and has not been topped up on the day ministers met. If the request is not accepted, the alternatives are the same as last week: delay, group with other traffic if the operation offers that product, proceed unescorted under the company\u2019s BMP and flag guidance, or divert via the Cape. Italy\u2019s national-escort option, if used, is a national product for Italian merchant ships. It is not a general-traffic lane. French hulls reported in the wider region are not automatically a Red Sea close-protection screen. US aerial support that exists in Hormuz is not an on-request Red Sea cover, a point already recorded in the Yanbu war-risk file. Quoted war-risk for Saudi-linked tankers calling Yanbu has been running around 3 percent of hull value, with Jizan and ports south of Yanbu reported up to 7 percent. That market does not move because a High Representative asks for more frigates.<\/p>\n

The extra March tasks on submarine-cable information, Djibouti training and Yemeni Coast Guard cooperation matter for the mission\u2019s workload. They do not change what a commercial operator can count on at Bab el-Mandeb tonight. A force that cannot meet \u201cnumerous\u201d escort requests while also watching cables and running partner training will ration close protection. Companies that have written Aspides into voyage instructions as if it were a standing convoy should rewrite those instructions against the Monday doorstep: the operation is still asking for hulls, not announcing them.<\/p>\n

What Operators Should Note<\/h2>\n