{"id":1315,"date":"2026-11-11T03:37:52","date_gmt":"2026-11-11T03:37:52","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/regulasshipping.com\/blog\/ukmto-201-26-records-a-tanker-projectile-hit-19-nm-northeast-of-lima\/"},"modified":"2026-11-11T03:38:52","modified_gmt":"2026-11-11T03:38:52","slug":"ukmto-201-26-records-a-tanker-projectile-hit-19-nm-northeast-of-lima","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/regulasshipping.com\/blog\/ukmto-201-26-records-a-tanker-projectile-hit-19-nm-northeast-of-lima\/","title":{"rendered":"UKMTO 201-26 records a tanker projectile hit 19 NM northeast of Lima"},"content":{"rendered":"

The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations centre published Warning 201-26 as a numbered PDF on its product board, filename 20261110-ukmto_warning_201_26.pdf<\/code>. The face of the product is titled 201-26 \u2014 ATTACK. The incident date is 10 November 2026. The incident time is 1338 UTC. The source line is Master. UKMTO states that it has received a report of an incident 19 nautical miles northeast of Lima, Oman. The Master of a Tanker reports being struck by an unknown projectile. The crew are safe and there is no environmental impact reported. Master will conduct damage assessment at first light. Vessels are advised to transit with caution and report any suspicious activity to UKMTO, whilst authorities investigate. The location footer printed on the product is Lima Oman. Emergency contacts printed on UKMTO warnings remain watchkeepers@ukmto.org, +44 (0) 2392 222060, +44 (0) 7779 966976 and +44 (0) 7585 795608.<\/p>\n

That is the working primary. Wednesday morning\u2019s product is a Master Attack on a 1338 UTC 10 November tanker clock, posted the same afternoon, unknown projectile, 19 nautical miles northeast of Lima, crew safe, no environmental impact, damage assessment deferred to first light. It is not a rewrite of Sunday morning\u2019s dedicated Warning 200-26, not a rewrite of Sunday morning\u2019s dedicated Warning 199-26, not a conversion of Tuesday night\u2019s dedicated Warning 195-26 \/ IMO Grit onto a later Lima projectile, and not a conversion of this morning\u2019s companion IMO 133-count onto a 10 November hull. It names a tanker, an unknown projectile, a 19-nautical-mile northeast-of-Lima offset, a crew-safe line, a no-environmental-impact line, and a first-light damage assessment. It does not name a merchant hull, an IMO number, a flag, a cargo grade, an attacker, a fire, a NUC or tow line, a latitude\/longitude beyond the 19-nautical-mile offset, a next port, or a keep-clear radius. UKMTO posted the numbered PDF on the 10 November product board against a 1338 UTC 10 November clock. Masters who brief Wednesday morning as 195-26\u2019s unnamed Lima engine-room tanker now recast as a later projectile, as 200-26\u2019s outbound Hormuz tanker, as 199-26\u2019s northwest-of-Khasab fire, or as an ADNOC Logistics & Services WAM statement on UAE territorial water will have merged four other series into a Master Attack that still withholds the struck hull and still withholds a fire.<\/p>\n

What the warning actually printed<\/h2>\n

The confirmed tape is the body of 201-26. UKMTO has received a report of an incident 19NM northeast of Lima, Oman. The Master of a Tanker reports being struck by an unknown projectile. The crew are safe and there is no environmental impact reported. Master will conduct damage assessment at first light. Vessels are advised to transit with caution and report any suspicious activity to UKMTO, whilst authorities investigate. That is the product. Stay with that wording. Do not invent a hull. Do not invent a flag. Do not invent a products, crude, LPG or LNG grade beyond the word tanker. Do not invent a UAV, a mine, a small-boat device or a boarding. 201-26 prints unknown projectile, not explosion, not fire, and not two projectiles. Do not invent a lat\/long on the UKMTO PDF. 201-26 does not print one. Do not invent a keep-clear radius around Lima, Khasab, Musandam, Fujairah or the TSS. The PDF does not print one. Do not invent a fire-extinguished line, a lost-propulsion line, a sunk line, an evacuation line, or a next-port name. The product already prints the crew are safe. It does not print that the crew left the ship. It does not print a destination. The crew line on this PDF is \u201cthe crew are safe,\u201d not \u201cevacuated,\u201d not \u201cunconfirmed at present,\u201d and not \u201cone seafarer fatality.\u201d Hold that wording. The environmental line is no environmental impact reported. Hold that too. The damage line is the Master will conduct damage assessment at first light. Hold that as an open survey, not as a completed class finding.<\/p>\n

The product type is the first briefing fact. 201-26 is Attack, the same family that ran dedicated 191-26 through 197-26 and dedicated 200-26, not the Suspicious Activity family that first ran dedicated 199-26, and not the Advisory family that ran dedicated 198-26. UKMTO later reclassified 199-26 to Attack on Update 001; that reclassification remains wrap on dedicated 199-26, unused as a second dedicated Khasab fire piece. 201-26 is a new numbered Attack on a later clock. UKMTO says a tanker 19 nautical miles northeast of Lima was struck by an unknown projectile. It does not say a small boat attached devices. It does not say a mine in the water. It does not say a UAV. It does not say the ship is on fire. It does not say the ship is at anchor, NUC, under tow, or sunk. A DPA who briefs Wednesday morning as \u201canother Hormuz fire, crew evacuated\u201d has borrowed 199-26\u2019s method and 199-26\u2019s crew line and has dropped the Attack stamp, the unknown projectile, the 19-nautical-mile Lima offset, the 1338 UTC clock and the Master source that are the whole of this PDF. A DPA who briefs Wednesday morning as a completed salvage because the crew are safe has under-read a numbered Attack that still withholds hull, damage volume and whether the ship is making way, and that still prints a first-light damage assessment rather than a closed survey.<\/p>\n

Master source, a same-day clock and a first-light damage line is the second briefing fact. The report sits on a Master source, not on Company Security Officer, not on Verified, and not on Military authorities. That is a different reporting path from Sunday morning\u2019s dedicated 200-26, whose source line is Company Security Officer, from Sunday morning\u2019s dedicated 199-26, whose source line is Military authorities, and from Thursday morning\u2019s dedicated 196-26, whose source line was Verified. Time-late is not printed on the face of this product. The incident clock is 1338 UTC on 10 November. The numbered PDF appeared on the 10 November board the same afternoon, around 1254 UTC on public UKMTO channels against a 1338 UTC incident \u2014 hold the PDF clock, not the channel timestamp, as the working time. Do not treat the 10 November filename as an overnight 9 November strike. Do not treat \u201cunknown projectile\u201d as a confirmed UAV, a confirmed mine, a confirmed small-boat pairing, or a confirmed two-projectile strike. Do not treat \u201cthe crew are safe\u201d as a class survey, and do not convert it into 199-26\u2019s evacuation line or into Thursday morning\u2019s unconfirmed crew line. The public PDF says there is no environmental impact reported. It does not say whether a fire started, whether a hole was found, whether a tug was offered, or where the ship went after 1338 UTC. First light after 1338 UTC on 10 November is the morning of 11 November in the Gulf. Wednesday morning\u2019s desk is that first-light window. Do not treat first light as already closed because the PDF is a day old.<\/p>\n

The geography is the third briefing fact. 201-26 prints 19NM northeast of Lima, Oman. The location footer is Lima Oman. That is the named offset, not Sunday morning\u2019s dedicated 200-26 Strait of Hormuz footer with no nautical-mile offset, not Sunday morning\u2019s dedicated 199-26 8-nautical-mile northwest-of-Khasab offset, not Friday night\u2019s 16-nautical-mile east-of-Khasab offset, and not Saturday night\u2019s 18-nautical-mile east-of-Khor-Fakkan Gulf of Oman offset. Dedicated 195-26 remains 14 nautical miles northeast of Lima. Five nautical miles of offset wording, seven days and a method change from two unknown projectiles into the engine room to one unknown projectile separate those two Lima files. A passage plan that only carried 195-26\u2019s 14-nautical-mile northeast-of-Lima engine-room watch, or that treated Wednesday as closed because 200-26 was the last UKMTO number at Tuesday afternoon\u2019s desk, has not budgeted a 1338 UTC unknown-projectile Attack on a tanker 19 nautical miles northeast of Lima.<\/p>\n

The numbering is the fourth briefing fact. 201-26 is numbered after 200-26 on the product board. It is a Warning, Attack. UKMTO\u2019s Attack series on this Wednesday board now ends at 201-26. Dedicated 200-26 remains the last previous Attack. Dedicated 199-26 remains the last Suspicious Activity product, later reclassified to Attack on Update 001 as wrap. Dedicated 198-26 remains the last Advisory. Do not brief Wednesday morning as \u201c201 after 200 on the same hull.\u201d Brief Wednesday morning as a later-issued Attack on a later 10 November tanker clock, incident 1338 UTC. There is no 202-26 this run.<\/p>\n

Industry colour of the same clock, held separately: Reuters \/ Arab News restated the public sentences \u2014 tanker struck by an unknown projectile 19 nautical miles northeast of Oman\u2019s Lima, crew safe, no environmental impact, damage assessment at first light. Those reprints are colour of the PDF, not a naming. Iran International restated the same public lines. Clearwater CW Alert 015-(Nov 26) restated the 1338 UTC tanker, 19nm Northeast of Lima, crew safe, no environmental impact, damage assessment at first light, and labelled the aggressor Military. Hold \u201cMilitary\u201d as colour, not a PDF fact. 201-26 prints unknown projectile and does not print an attacker. gCaptain, carrying ADNOC Logistics & Services via WAM, reported a separate ADNOC vessel damaged in an attack in UAE territorial waters on the afternoon of 10 November, identity, damage extent and crew status unpublished, and said it was not immediately clear whether that statement and 201-26 were connected. Hold the ADNOC \/ WAM statement as unused as dedicated and unused as a 201-26 naming. Do not collapse an unpublished ADNOC hull in UAE territorial water onto a Master Attack that prints 19 nautical miles northeast of Lima, Oman. Do not promote an ADNOC operator, a UAE territorial-water plot, or a WAM response-operations line onto this PDF. No numbered MSCIO wrap against the 1338 UTC Lima clock was retrieved this run.<\/p>\n

What this is not<\/h2>\n

This is not Warning 200-26, and it is not Sunday morning\u2019s unnamed outbound Hormuz projectile. Sunday morning\u2019s dedicated Warning 200-26 remains an Attack, incident 7 November 2026, 2020 UTC, source Company Security Officer, time-late, filename 20261108-ukmto_warning-200-26.pdf<\/code>: tanker struck by an unknown projectile while transiting outbound through the Strait of Hormuz; all crew safe and accounted for; no reported environmental impact at this time; location footer Strait of Hormuz. 201-26 is Attack, incident 10 November 2026, 1338 UTC, source Master, tanker struck by an unknown projectile 19 nautical miles northeast of Lima, crew safe, no environmental impact reported, damage assessment at first light, footer Lima Oman. Three days, a source change from CSO to Master, a geography change from a Strait of Hormuz footer with no offset to a 19-nautical-mile northeast-of-Lima offset, and a first-light damage line that 200-26 does not print separate the two clocks. An outbound Hormuz CSO Attack with no printed offset is not a Master Attack 19 nautical miles northeast of Lima. Do not convert Wednesday\u2019s tanker onto Sunday\u2019s outbound tanker. Do not convert Sunday\u2019s \u201call crew are safe and accounted for\u201d onto Wednesday\u2019s \u201cthe crew are safe.\u201d Do not drop Wednesday\u2019s first-light survey because Sunday\u2019s PDF already printed no environmental impact.<\/p>\n

This is not Warning 199-26, and it is not Sunday morning\u2019s unnamed northwest-of-Khasab fire. Sunday morning\u2019s dedicated Warning 199-26 remains a time-late tanker fire 8 nautical miles northwest of Khasab, Oman, crew evacuated, source Military authorities, first posted as Suspicious Activity. UKMTO Warning 199-26 Update 001, filename 20261108-ukmto_warning-_199-26_update_001.pdf<\/code>, later reclassified that incident to ATTACK and printed 1920 UTC on 7 November. That Update 001 remains wrap on dedicated 199-26, unused as a second dedicated Khasab fire piece. This morning\u2019s companion IMO 133-count is the first official IMO print of NAVIG8 MACALLISTER, IMO 9482873, against that 8-nautical-mile northwest-of-Khasab 7 November clock \u2014 wrap on the IMO file, unused as a 201-26 naming. 201-26 is Attack, 10 November, 1338 UTC, source Master, unknown projectile, 19 nautical miles northeast of Lima, crew safe, no environmental impact, first-light damage assessment. A Khasab fire with an evacuation is not a Lima projectile with a crew-safe-onboard line. Do not convert Wednesday\u2019s projectile onto Sunday\u2019s fire. Do not convert Wednesday\u2019s crew-safe line onto Sunday\u2019s evacuation. Do not promote NAVIG8 MACALLISTER, IMO 9482873, or an 8-nautical-mile northwest-of-Khasab offset onto a PDF that prints 19 nautical miles northeast of Lima and does not print a hull.<\/p>\n

This is not Warning 195-26, and it is not Tuesday night\u2019s unnamed Lima engine-room tanker. Tuesday night\u2019s dedicated Warning 195-26 remains a CSO Attack, incident 3 November 2026, 1900 UTC: tanker struck by two unknown projectiles into the engine room, 14 nautical miles northeast of Lima, Oman; no casualties or environmental impact reported as this time; location footer Lima, Oman. Wednesday morning\u2019s dedicated IMO 128-count companion later named GRIT, IMO 9243150, 3 November, 14NM northeast of Lima, damaged, no pollution \u2014 wrap on dedicated 195-26, unused as a 201-26 naming. 201-26 is 10 November, 1338 UTC, source Master, one unknown projectile, 19 nautical miles northeast of Lima, crew safe, no environmental impact, first-light damage assessment. Seven days, a source change from CSO to Master, a method change from two unknown projectiles into the engine room to one unknown projectile, and a five-nautical-mile offset change separate the two clocks. A CSO Attack that prints two projectiles and an engine room is not a Master Attack that prints one unknown projectile and does not print engine room. Do not convert Wednesday\u2019s tanker onto 3 November\u2019s Lima tanker. Do not promote Grit, IMO 9243150, two projectiles, or an engine-room line onto 201-26.<\/p>\n

This is not Warning 197-26, and it is not Friday night\u2019s unnamed east-of-Khasab tanker. Friday night\u2019s dedicated Warning 197-26 remains an Attack, incident 5 November 2026, 2200 UTC, source Master, time-late, filename 20261106-ukmto_warning-197-26.pdf<\/code>: tanker transiting the Strait of Hormuz outbound, explosion at the waterline, port side, 16 nautical miles east of Khasab, Oman; crew safe and accounted for; tanker still under its own power and continuing on its voyage; location footer Khasab, Oman. Monday midday\u2019s dedicated IMO 130-count named VIEILA, IMO 9234654, against that 5 November Khasab offset. 201-26 is 10 November, 1338 UTC, unknown projectile, 19 nautical miles northeast of Lima, no own-power line, no continuing-voyage line, footer Lima Oman. Five days, a method change from waterline explosion to unknown projectile, and a sea change from east of Khasab to northeast of Lima separate the two Master Attacks. Do not convert Wednesday\u2019s tanker onto Friday\u2019s Khasab tanker. Do not convert Friday\u2019s port-side waterline explosion onto Wednesday\u2019s unnamed projectile. Do not promote Vieila onto this PDF.<\/p>\n

This is not Advisory 198-26, not Warning 196-26 \/ Velos Sapphire, not 194-26, not 193-26, and not 191-26. Saturday night\u2019s dedicated Advisory 198-26 remains an Advisory, bulk carrier and military forces, 18 nautical miles east of Khor Fakkan, incident time TBC; Tuesday morning\u2019s dedicated IMO 131-count named HUDA, IMO 9197088, against that 7 November Oman-coast clock. Thursday morning\u2019s dedicated Warning 196-26 remains an Attack, tanker struck by two unidentified projectiles, 50 nautical miles north of Madinat ash Shamal, Qatar; Friday afternoon\u2019s dedicated IMO fatality conversion remains Velos Sapphire, IMO 9321201, one seafarer fatality, wrap on that Qatar sheet. Tuesday night\u2019s dedicated 194-26 remains an Indian-crewed dhow. Last week\u2019s dedicated 193-26 remains a Master Attack, 2020 UTC 1 November, hole on the starboard side, 9 nautical miles northeast of Lima. Sunday night\u2019s dedicated 191-26 remains a Channel 16 Mayday-relay Attack. 201-26 prints tanker, unknown projectile, 19 nautical miles northeast of Lima, 1338 UTC 10 November, crew safe, no environmental impact, first-light damage assessment. It does not print bulk carrier, Huda, Qatar, two projectiles, dhow, starboard hole, Mayday, or 1 November. Do not collapse those files onto this number because they share outbound, Hormuz, Lima, Master or Attack family.<\/p>\n

This is not an ADNOC Logistics & Services naming, not Update 113, and not a 10 November IMO row. gCaptain, carrying ADNOC Logistics & Services via WAM, reported a vessel damaged in an attack in UAE territorial waters on the afternoon of 10 November, identity unpublished, and treated that statement as not immediately reconciled with 201-26. Hold that WAM line unused as dedicated and unused as a completed 201-26 naming. 201-26 prints Lima, Oman, 19 nautical miles northeast, Master, tanker, unknown projectile. It does not print ADNOC, UAE territorial water, or a logistics-and-services operator. Last week\u2019s dedicated Update 112, ICOD 081300 UTC 8 November, remains the last numbered public periodic note. Its confirmed-incidents table closed before this 1338 UTC 10 November clock. This morning\u2019s companion IMO board, as at 10 November, prints 133 confirmed \/ 25 dead with NAVIG8 MACALLISTER as the named top row and does not print a 10 November hull. IMO has not named 201-26. No 202-26, no Update 113 and no IMO 134 this run.<\/p>\n

Operational implications<\/h2>\n

For a master already shaping a Hormuz outbound, Musandam, Khasab, Lima, Fujairah, Khor Fakkan, Sohar or Gulf of Oman coastal transit, or holding in the Southern Gulf this morning, Wednesday is a same-week Attack on a 1338 UTC 10 November Master tanker clock, on top of Sunday morning\u2019s dedicated 200-26 outbound Hormuz projectile, on top of Sunday morning\u2019s dedicated 199-26 northwest-of-Khasab fire, and on top of Tuesday night\u2019s dedicated 195-26 14-nautical-mile northeast-of-Lima engine-room watch. Update 112 remains the last numbered JMIC note and still prints Hormuz SEVERE and Arabian Gulf SUBSTANTIAL, with an ICOD that closed before this clock. 016-26 remains the working blockade document pack for hulls that still need the Strait. 201-26 adds a tanker that reported an unknown-projectile strike 19 nautical miles northeast of Lima at 1338 UTC on 10 November, with crew safe, no environmental impact reported, and a damage assessment deferred to first light. A passage plan that only carried 200-26\u2019s outbound Hormuz Attack, or that treated Wednesday as closed because 200-26 was the last UKMTO number at Tuesday afternoon\u2019s desk, has not budgeted a 1338 UTC projectile 19 nautical miles northeast of Lima and has not budgeted the first-light survey window that is still open this morning.<\/p>\n

An unknown projectile, learned from the Master on a same-day clock, with crew safe, no environmental impact reported, and a first-light damage assessment, is a standoff watchkeeping problem and an open-survey problem before it is a war-risk rewrite. 201-26 is not 199-26\u2019s fire-and-evacuation problem. It is not 197-26\u2019s waterline-explosion, own-power problem. It is not 195-26\u2019s two-projectile engine-room problem. It is not 187-26\u2019s alongside, slow-speed, above-waterline device problem. It is a lookout, CPA, AIS-on\/AIS-off, citadel and damage-watch problem at the same time as it is a first-light survey problem. BMP MS projectile and citadel guidance remains the working industry pack; 201-26 does not reprint it and does not order an armed team. It also does not authorise a master to treat every radar contact northeast of Lima as a confirmed Attack, or to treat every AIS-on tanker as 200-26, 199-26, Grit, Vieila or Louise 1 after the fact. Log the Warning number, the 10 November date, the 1338 UTC clock, the Master source line, the tanker type, the 19-nautical-mile northeast-of-Lima offset, the unknown-projectile method, the crew-safe line, the no-environmental-impact line, and the first-light damage-assessment line. Do not log a hull, 199-26\u2019s fire, 199-26\u2019s evacuation, 195-26\u2019s engine room, 200-26\u2019s outbound Hormuz footer, an ADNOC operator, a NUC, a sunk line, or an Omani-port finding that the PDF does not print.<\/p>\n

The missing hull, fire and damage-volume lines are the practical damage watch, not a completed all-clear. The public PDF says the crew are safe and there is no environmental impact reported. Those are status sentences. They are not a class survey, and they are not a finding that the hull is undamaged. 201-26 prints the opposite of a closed survey: Master will conduct damage assessment at first light. Next-port authorities will want a written account that 201-26 does not contain. Charterers and war-risk underwriters will now ask whether the ship was 19 nautical miles northeast of Lima after 1338 UTC on 10 November, whether the Master reported on time, whether first light produced a class or flag note, and whether the ship was following Update 112 and 016-26. They will not be answered by Sunday\u2019s 200-26 projectile, by Sunday\u2019s 199-26 fire, by IMO\u2019s Navig8 Macallister row, by IMO\u2019s Grit row, or by a WAM statement that names a different unpublished hull on UAE territorial water.<\/p>\n

For a DPA and an operator with any merchant hull still using Hormuz, Musandam, Khasab, Lima, Fujairah, Khor Fakkan or the Gulf of Oman, the reporting split is the operational content. Sightings of explosions, fire, smoke, a disabled tanker, a Mayday on Channel 16 or pollution go to UKMTO on the 201-26 action line and to the company security officer. NAVCENT NCAGS remains the 016-26 blockade mailbox for hulls that still need the Strait. MSCIO remains the EU ATALANTA registration and alert desk; no numbered MSCIO wrap against the 1338 UTC Lima clock was retrieved this run. Registering with one mailbox is not a substitute for the others. 201-26 does not order a daylight-only transit, a deviation around a published circle, or a halt to visit-and-search compliance. Keep Update 112 Hormuz SEVERE \/ Arabian Gulf SUBSTANTIAL and 016-26 visit-and-search in the master\u2019s pack. Watch a PDF revision that names a hull, prints a type beyond tanker, a lat\/long, a NUC, a tow, a fire, a flooding line, a casualty line, a completed first-light survey or a next-port line; a NAVAREA that plots this tanker rather than Grit, Navig8 Macallister, Selat Storm, RITI, Quba or Louise 1; a flag or class note; a JMIC Update 113; or an IMO-board row on a 10 November hull \u2014 not a headline that 200-26 closed Wednesday\u2019s Attack, that Grit is this tanker, or that an ADNOC WAM statement completed a naming.<\/p>\n

Keep the dedicated files on their own lines. 200-26 remains Sunday morning\u2019s dedicated CSO Attack on an outbound Hormuz tanker, unknown projectile, 2020 UTC 7 November, crew safe, no environmental impact, footer Strait of Hormuz. 199-26 remains Sunday morning\u2019s dedicated tanker fire 8 nautical miles northwest of Khasab, crew evacuated, military authorities, later reclassified to Attack on Update 001 as wrap; this morning\u2019s companion IMO 133-count remains the first official print of Navig8 Macallister against that Khasab clock, unused as a 201-26 naming. 198-26 remains Saturday night\u2019s dedicated Advisory on a bulk carrier and military forces 18 nautical miles east of Khor Fakkan; Tuesday morning\u2019s dedicated IMO 131-count remains the Huda conversion on that Oman-coast sheet. 197-26 remains Friday night\u2019s dedicated Master Attack on a tanker 16 nautical miles east of Khasab, explosion at the waterline port side, crew safe, under own power. 196-26 remains Thursday morning\u2019s dedicated Verified Attack on a tanker 50 nautical miles north of Madinat ash Shamal, two unidentified projectiles, crew unconfirmed; Friday afternoon\u2019s dedicated IMO 25-fatality conversion remains Velos Sapphire on that Qatar sheet. 195-26 remains Tuesday night\u2019s dedicated CSO Attack on a tanker 14 nautical miles northeast of Lima, two unknown projectiles into the engine room, no casualties; IMO Grit remains wrap on that number. Update 112 remains ICOD 081300 UTC, 177 incidents. 016-26 remains the blockade document pack. Last night\u2019s dedicated NAVAREA IX 435\/26 remains the second Fujairah SKATE 3D box through 20 November. Last night\u2019s dedicated Irakleio 1441\/26 remains the unauthorised FA76-1127-26 void on the Abeille Marengo file. Do not recast 11 November morning as a named Lima tanker, as 200-26 recast, as 195-26 filed twice, as an ADNOC naming, as Update 113, or as IMO moving a 10 November hull onto the 133-count.<\/p>\n

What Operators Should Note<\/h2>\n
    \n
  • Log 201-26 as a 10 November Lima tanker Attack on a Master clock, not as a 200-26 rewrite and not as a 195-26 rewrite.<\/strong> UKMTO Warning 201-26, incident 10 November 2026, 1338 UTC, source Master. Filename 20261110-ukmto_warning_201_26.pdf<\/code>. Tanker struck by an unknown projectile 19 nautical miles northeast of Lima, Oman. Crew safe. No environmental impact reported. Master will conduct damage assessment at first light. Transit with caution. Report suspicious activity to UKMTO, watchkeepers@ukmto.org \/ +44 (0) 2392 222060. Authorities are investigating. Location footer Lima Oman. UKMTO printed neither hull, IMO, flag, cargo, attacker, fire, lat\/long beyond the 19-nautical-mile offset, anchorage, NUC, tow, next port, nor a keep-clear radius. This is not 200-26, not 199-26 \/ Navig8 Macallister, not 195-26 \/ Grit, not 197-26 \/ Vieila, and not 198-26 \/ Huda.<\/li>\n
  • Hold the clock, the water and the first-light stamp.<\/strong> 201-26 is Attack, not Suspicious Activity. The working date is 10 November. The working time is 1338 UTC. The working source is Master, not Company Security Officer and not Military authorities. The working type is tanker. The working water is 19 nautical miles northeast of Lima, Oman, footer Lima Oman. The working method is an unknown projectile \u2014 not a fire, not two projectiles, and not a waterline explosion. The crew line is the crew are safe, not evacuated. The environmental line is no environmental impact reported. The damage line is a first-light assessment, not a closed survey. The product number is 201. The incident clock sits after 200-26\u2019s 2020 UTC 7 November outbound Hormuz tanker and after 195-26\u2019s 1900 UTC 3 November Lima tanker. Do not brief Wednesday morning as \u201c200-26\u2019s outbound projectile, now off Lima.\u201d Do not treat first light as already closed because the PDF posted on 10 November.<\/li>\n
  • Hold 200-26 and 199-26 on their own lines.<\/strong> Dedicated 200-26 remains Attack, incident 7 November 2026, 2020 UTC, source Company Security Officer, time-late: tanker struck by an unknown projectile while transiting outbound through the Strait of Hormuz; crew safe and accounted for; no reported environmental impact; footer Strait of Hormuz. Dedicated 199-26 remains the 8-nautical-mile northwest-of-Khasab tanker fire, crew evacuated, military authorities, 1920 UTC 7 November on Update 001, later reclassified to Attack as wrap. This morning\u2019s companion IMO 133-count names NAVIG8 MACALLISTER against that Khasab clock, unused as a 201-26 hull. Two Sunday warnings and one Wednesday warning are three warnings. Do not merge Wednesday\u2019s projectile into Sunday\u2019s outbound projectile. Do not merge Wednesday\u2019s crew-safe line into Sunday\u2019s evacuation. Do not treat 8 nautical miles northwest of Khasab as 201-26\u2019s plot.<\/li>\n
  • Do not collapse 195-26 \/ Grit, 197-26 \/ Vieila, 198-26 \/ Huda or 196-26 \/ Velos Sapphire onto this number.<\/strong> 195-26 remains Tuesday night\u2019s dedicated CSO Attack on a tanker 14 nautical miles northeast of Lima, two unknown projectiles into the engine room, no casualties; IMO Grit, IMO 9243150, remains wrap on that 3 November row. 197-26 remains Friday night\u2019s dedicated Master Attack on a tanker 16 nautical miles east of Khasab, explosion at the waterline port side, crew safe, under own power. 198-26 remains Saturday night\u2019s dedicated Advisory on a bulk carrier and military forces 18 nautical miles east of Khor Fakkan; Tuesday morning\u2019s dedicated IMO 131-count remains the Huda conversion. 196-26 remains Thursday morning\u2019s dedicated Verified Attack on a tanker 50 nautical miles north of Madinat ash Shamal, two unidentified projectiles, crew unconfirmed; Friday afternoon\u2019s dedicated IMO 25-fatality conversion remains Velos Sapphire on that Qatar sheet. A 19-nautical-mile northeast-of-Lima unknown-projectile Attack is not a 14-nautical-mile northeast-of-Lima engine-room Attack, and it is not an 8-nautical-mile northwest-of-Khasab fire. Five products are five products. A 10 November Lima tanker is a sixth overnight file. Do not make them one hull.<\/li>\n
  • Do not promote an ADNOC WAM statement, Clearwater \u201cMilitary,\u201d or a 10 November IMO row onto this PDF.<\/strong> ADNOC Logistics & Services, via WAM, remains unused as dedicated: unpublished hull, UAE territorial water, afternoon of 10 November, response operations ongoing. gCaptain treated that statement as not immediately reconciled with 201-26. Do not collapse it onto Lima. Clearwater\u2019s Military label stays colour. This morning\u2019s companion IMO board, as at 10 November, prints 133 confirmed \/ 25 dead with NAVIG8 MACALLISTER as the named top row and does not print a 10 November hull. IMO has not named 201-26. Update 112 remains ICOD 081300 UTC; this 1338 UTC 10 November clock sits after that cut-off. 016-26 remains the blockade document pack. No Update 113, no 202-26, no IMO 134 this run.<\/li>\n
  • Treat the missing hull and the first-light line as open damage lines.<\/strong> The public tape prints tanker, 19 nautical miles northeast of Lima, unknown projectile, 1338 UTC 10 November, crew safe, no environmental impact reported, damage assessment at first light. It does not print a hull, a cargo grade, a fire, a survey result, a hole size, a NUC interval, a tug, own power, a next-port name or a class note. Keep Update 112 Hormuz SEVERE \/ Arabian Gulf SUBSTANTIAL and 016-26 visit-and-search in the master\u2019s pack. Sightings go to UKMTO, MSCIO, the Omani authorities and the CSO. Watch a PDF revision that names a hull or prints a lat\/long or a completed first-light survey; a NAVAREA that plots this tanker rather than Grit or Navig8 Macallister; a flag or class note; a JMIC Update 113; or an IMO-board row on a 10 November hull \u2014 not a headline that 200-26 closed Wednesday\u2019s Attack or that an ADNOC statement completed a naming.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

    Regulas Shipping will keep lining Warning 201-26 against Sunday morning\u2019s dedicated Warning 200-26 and against Tuesday night\u2019s dedicated Warning 195-26 so operators can treat Wednesday morning\u2019s tape as a numbered Master Attack on a tanker 19 nautical miles northeast of Lima, not as an outbound-Hormuz rewrite, a 3 November engine-room reprint, an ADNOC naming, or a completed class survey.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations centre published Warning 201-26 as a numbered PDF on its product board, filename 20261110-ukmto_warning_201_26.pdf. The face of the product is titled 201-26 \u2014 ATTACK. The incident date is 10 November 2026. The incident time is 1338 UTC. The source line is Master. UKMTO states that it has received a […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":1313,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"wpai_generated_summary":"","wpai_meta_description":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[26,18,4],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1315","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-highlights","category-maritime-industry","category-maritime-security"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/regulasshipping.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1315","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/regulasshipping.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/regulasshipping.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/regulasshipping.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/regulasshipping.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1315"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/regulasshipping.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1315\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1316,"href":"https:\/\/regulasshipping.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1315\/revisions\/1316"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/regulasshipping.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1313"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/regulasshipping.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1315"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/regulasshipping.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1315"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/regulasshipping.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1315"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}