{"id":1141,"date":"2026-10-30T11:41:14","date_gmt":"2026-10-30T11:41:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/regulasshipping.com\/blog\/ukmto-187-26-records-a-small-boat-explosive-attack-25-nm-northeast-of-khasab\/"},"modified":"2026-10-30T11:41:14","modified_gmt":"2026-10-30T11:41:14","slug":"ukmto-187-26-records-a-small-boat-explosive-attack-25-nm-northeast-of-khasab","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/regulasshipping.com\/blog\/ukmto-187-26-records-a-small-boat-explosive-attack-25-nm-northeast-of-khasab\/","title":{"rendered":"UKMTO 187-26 records a small-boat explosive attack 25 NM northeast of Khasab"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations centre published Warning 187-26 Update 001 as a numbered PDF on its product board, filename <code>20261029-ukmto_warning-187-26-update-001.pdf<\/code>. The face of the product is titled 187-26 \u2014 ATTACK UPDATE 001. The incident date is 29 October 2026. The incident time is 2212 UTC. The source line is Verified. UKMTO states that it has received a report of an incident 25 nautical miles northeast of Khasab, Oman, in the Strait of Hormuz. A third party had reported that a tanker transiting outbound was on fire, with the cause unknown at the time of that first report, and with crew status, damage assessment and environmental impact then unknown. Update 001, date-time group 300150Z October 2026, records a verified report confirming the crew are safe and there is no environmental impact. The report indicates that the tanker was approached on the port side by a small boat which attached two explosive devices to the hull above the waterline. The subsequent blasts resulted in a fire in the engine room which temporarily disabled the vessel. The fire is now reported as extinguished and the vessel is continuing to its next port of call. Vessels are advised to transit with caution and report any suspicious activity to UKMTO, whilst authorities investigate. The location footer on the PDF is Khasab, Oman. Emergency contacts printed on the product remain watchkeepers@ukmto.org and +44 (0)2392222060.<\/p>\n<p>That is the working primary. Friday\u2019s product is a Warning typed as Attack, with an Update 001 on the same number, not a Suspicious Activity file and not an Advisory. It does not name a merchant hull, an IMO number, a flag, a cargo, an attacker, a NUC or tow line, an anchorage, or a latitude\/longitude beyond the 25-nautical-mile northeast-of-Khasab offset. Thursday late-morning\u2019s dedicated 185-26 piece on this desk, published about 11:35 UTC, still told operators that UKMTO ended at Suspicious Activity 185-26. 186-26 and 187-26 were not on that board when that note was written. Masters who brief Friday as a rewrite of the 9-nautical-mile north-of-Khasab fire, as a named Louise 1, as a RITI wreck, or as Update 109 will have merged four other series into a new Attack clock.<\/p>\n<h2>What the warning actually printed<\/h2>\n<p>The confirmed tape is the body of 187-26 Update 001. UKMTO has received a report of an incident 25NM Northeast of Khasab, Oman in the Strait of Hormuz. A third-party has reported that a tanker transiting outbound is on fire, the cause is unknown at time of report. Status of crew, damage assessment, and environmental impact are unknown at present. Update 001: 300150ZOCT26: UKMTO has received a verified report confirming the crew are safe, and there is no environmental impact. The report indicates that the tanker was approached on the port side by a small boat which attached two explosive devices to the hull above the waterline. The subsequent blasts resulted in a fire in the engine room which temporarily disabled the vessel. The fire is now reported as extinguished and vessel is continuing to its next port of call. Vessels are advised to transit with caution and report any suspicious activity to UKMTO, whilst authorities investigate. That is the product. Stay with that wording. Do not invent a hull. Do not invent a flag. Do not invent a limpet-mine type, a drone, a projectile or a boarding. Do not invent a lat\/long on the UKMTO PDF. 187-26 does not print one. Do not invent a keep-clear radius around Khasab. The PDF does not print one.<\/p>\n<p>The product type is the first briefing fact. 187-26 is Attack, the same family that ran 174-26 through 177-26, 179-26, 180-26, 181-26, 182-26 and Thursday afternoon\u2019s unused 186-26, not the Suspicious Activity family that ran 183-26 and Thursday morning\u2019s dedicated 185-26, and not the Advisory family that ran 184-26 and 178-26. UKMTO says a small boat approached on the port side and attached two explosive devices to the hull above the waterline. It does not say a projectile. It does not say a mine in the water. It does not say a UAV. It does not say the ship is at anchor, NUC, under tow, or sunk. A DPA who briefs Friday as \u201canother Hormuz projectile, hull unnamed, continuing\u201d has borrowed 186-26\u2019s unknown-projectile language and has dropped the attached-device line that is the whole of Update 001. A DPA who briefs Friday as a completed salvage because the fire is out has under-read a numbered Attack that already puts a temporarily disabled outbound tanker 25 nautical miles northeast of Khasab on the board.<\/p>\n<p>Verified, 2212 UTC and 300150Z is the second briefing fact. The original third-party fire report sat on an outbound tanker with crew, damage and pollution then unknown. Update 001, six hours and 38 minutes later on a Zulu clock, converts that fire into a verified Attack: crew safe, no environmental impact, two devices above the waterline, engine-room fire, temporary disablement, fire extinguished, continuing to next port. Channel 16, the UKMTO emergency line and the company duty officer still have to be on the night orders for any hull working the Musandam approaches or the southern Hormuz corridor. Do not treat \u201cVerified\u201d as a hull naming. Do not treat \u201ccontinuing to its next port of call\u201d as a completed class survey or as a closed damage file.<\/p>\n<p>The method line is the third briefing fact. Until Thursday night the dedicated Hormuz Attack files on this desk were unknown-projectile or small-craft fire products. 187-26 is the first numbered UKMTO Attack on this run of the board that prints a small boat attaching two explosive devices to the hull above the waterline. That is a alongside, slow-speed, above-waterline problem, not a standoff projectile problem. It is not a mine-in-the-TSS finding. Stay with attached, above the waterline, port side, two devices, engine-room fire. Do not convert it into a torpedo, a UAV or an IRGC mine confirmation because those words are easier to brief.<\/p>\n<p>Industry colour of the same clock, held separately: Seatrade Maritime, quoting Vanguard Tech, names the tanker as the Panama-flagged Louise 1, about 159,092 dwt, with Panama-based Aquarius Maritime Ventures as owner on Pole Star colour. Arab News and Reuters reprints restated the UKMTO attached-device, engine-room fire, crew-safe, no-pollution, continuing-voyage sentences without adding a hull. Those extras are not on the UKMTO PDF. UKMTO printed \u201ctanker,\u201d not Louise 1. It printed no flag, no dwt, no owner and no IMO. Treat Vanguard\u2019s Louise 1 \/ Panama \/ Aquarius lines as industry colour. Do not collapse them onto 187-26 as a naming, a flag line, or a completed identification.<\/p>\n<h2>What this is not<\/h2>\n<p>This is not a rewrite of 185-26, and it is not Friday\u2019s companion dhow wreck. Thursday late-morning\u2019s dedicated Warning 185-26 remains a Suspicious Activity fire sighting 9 nautical miles north of Khasab at 0300 UTC, Third Party, unnamed vessel, crew then unknown. Friday\u2019s dedicated NAVAREA IX 417\/26, issued 291500 UTC, is the working wreck instrument on dhow MSV Quba, MNV 2183, reported sunk in 26-19.95N 056-16.82E, about 3.5 nautical miles west of Jazirat Um Al Ghanam. 187-26 prints a tanker, 25 nautical miles northeast of Khasab, 2212 UTC, Attack, continuing. Nine nautical miles north of Khasab is not 25 nautical miles northeast of Khasab. A dhow is not a tanker. A sunk plot is not a continuing voyage. Do not merge the morning fire onto the night Attack because both footers print Khasab.<\/p>\n<p>This is not a rewrite of 186-26. Thursday afternoon\u2019s Warning 186-26 remains an unused Attack on this desk: incident 29 October 2026, 1600 UTC, source Company Security Officer, tanker struck by an unknown projectile whilst completing an outbound transit of the Strait of Hormuz, no reported injuries, no environmental impact report, location footer Khasab, Oman, filename <code>20261029-ukmto_warning-186-26.pdf<\/code>. 186-26 prints projectile. 187-26 prints two explosive devices attached above the waterline. 1600 UTC is not 2212 UTC. Do not collapse two Thursday Attacks onto one hull, one weapon or one clock. 186-26 is wrap on today\u2019s 187-26 piece and remains unused as a dedicated file unless a later PDF names that hull, upgrades the damage line, or a NAVAREA plots it.<\/p>\n<p>This is not NAVAREA IX 420\/26. Pakistan\u2019s Friday in-force table prints 420\/26 at 300300 UTC as an oil tanker RITI involved in a security incident causing fire onboard and anchored in 26-24.07N 056-24.72E, approximately 1 nautical mile northwest of Ra\u2019s Tahir, mariners cautioned. 187-26 prints no name, no lat\/long and no anchorage. It prints continuing to next port of call. Do not convert RITI onto 187-26 as a UKMTO naming. Do not convert 187-26\u2019s continuing-voyage line into 420\/26\u2019s anchored line. Hold 420\/26 as a separate NAVAREA naming, unused as a dedicated rewrite of this Attack unless a later UKMTO PDF, flag or class note prints RITI against the 2212 UTC clock.<\/p>\n<p>This is not Update 109, and it is not an International Maritime Organization 122-count. JMIC Update 109, JMIC# 001 26, ICOD 291300 UTC 29 October, remains the last numbered public periodic note, with Hormuz SEVERE, the Arabian Gulf SUBSTANTIAL, the Gulf of Oman MODERATE and 160 incidents since 1 March. Update 109\u2019s last 96-hour list ends at 185-26 as Unknown \/ Suspicious activity \/ 9 nautical miles north of Khasab. 186-26 at 1600 UTC and 187-26 at 2212 UTC both sit after that cut-off. They are not on that note. Wednesday afternoon\u2019s dedicated JMIC Advisory Note 016-26 remains the blockade visit-and-search document pack. The IMO highlighted-incidents board is still 121 confirmed \/ 24 seafarer fatalities as at 27 October, with Leonora Kosan still the newest named row. 187-26 does not fill those slots. This is not Thursday\u2019s dedicated Contship Jet or Khoryv Black Sea files. NAVWARN 768\/26 and 766\/26 are Kaliakra and Shabla products. They do not belong on a Khasab Attack.<\/p>\n<h2>Operational implications<\/h2>\n<p>For a master already in the Strait of Hormuz, shaping an outbound transit past Musandam, or working Khasab, Bukha, Limah, Fujairah or Khor Fakkan this morning, Friday is an attached-device Attack on a new 25-nautical-mile northeast-of-Khasab offset, on top of Thursday\u2019s 9-nautical-mile north-of-Khasab fire and Thursday afternoon\u2019s unused 186-26 projectile Attack. Update 109 remains the last numbered JMIC note and still prints Hormuz SEVERE. 016-26 remains the working blockade document pack: continuous VHF 16, follow US forces, be prepared to alter, stop or come dead in the water, and have the six signed-or-stamped PDFs ready. 187-26 adds a verified small-boat approach on the port side of an outbound tanker after dark. A passage plan that only carried Update 109\u2019s SEVERE line, or that treated Musandam as a projectile-only problem because the last dedicated Hormuz Attack on this desk was 182-26, has not budgeted a 2212 UTC Thursday night alongside approach 25 nautical miles northeast of Khasab.<\/p>\n<p>Above-waterline devices on the port side are a close-range watchkeeping problem before they are a war-risk rewrite. A small boat that can reach the hull in the strait is a lookout, CPA, searchlight, AIS-on\/AIS-off and citadel problem at the same time as it is a fire, engine-room and temporary-disablement problem. BMP MS small-craft and citadel guidance remains the working industry pack; 187-26 does not reprint it and does not order an armed team. It also does not authorise a master to treat every skiff in the TSS as a confirmed Attack. Log the Warning number, the 2212 UTC clock, the 25-nautical-mile northeast-of-Khasab offset, the Verified source line, the two-device method, the engine-room fire, the temporary disablement, the crew-safe and no-pollution lines, and the continuing-voyage line. Do not log Louise 1, RITI, a projectile, a mine in the water, or an IRGC attribution that the PDF does not print.<\/p>\n<p>Temporary disablement and continuing voyage are the practical damage watch, not a completed all-clear. An engine-room fire that took propulsion off the board, even briefly, is a class, P&amp;I, flag and next-port problem before anyone has a public survey. The public PDF does not say how long the ship was disabled, whether steering was lost, whether a tug was offered, whether the hull is holed above the waterline, or where \u201cnext port of call\u201d is. Those missing lines are omissions. They are not a completed \u201call well,\u201d and they are not a NUC. Next-port authorities will want a written account that 187-26 does not contain. Charterers and war-risk underwriters will now ask whether the ship was 25 nautical miles northeast of Khasab after 2212 UTC 29 October, whether it reported, and whether it was following Update 109 and 016-26. They will not be answered by Thursday morning\u2019s 185-26 fire sighting, by Tuesday\u2019s 121-count, or by Monday\u2019s 183-26 Al-Faw fire.<\/p>\n<p>For a DPA and an operator with tankers, LPG, products or any merchant hull still using the southern Hormuz corridor, the reporting split is the operational content. Sightings of small craft closing the port quarter, devices on the hull, fire, smoke, a disabled hull or pollution go to UKMTO on the 187-26 action line and to the company security officer. NAVCENT NCAGS remains the 016-26 blockade mailbox. MSCIO remains the EU ATALANTA registration and alert desk. Registering with one mailbox is not a substitute for the others. 187-26 does not order a daylight-only transit, a deviation around a published circle, or a halt to visit-and-search compliance. Keep Update 109 Hormuz SEVERE and 016-26 visit-and-search in the master\u2019s pack. Watch a PDF revision that names a hull, prints a lat\/long, a NUC, a tow or an anchorage; a NAVAREA that plots this tanker rather than RITI; a flag or class note; a JMIC Update 110; or an IMO-board row \u2014 not a headline that Thursday night closed the strait.<\/p>\n<p>Keep the dedicated files on their own lines. 185-26 remains Thursday\u2019s 9-nautical-mile north-of-Khasab fire sighting. 417\/26 remains Friday\u2019s dedicated MSV Quba wreck. 186-26 remains the unused 1600 UTC unknown-projectile Attack. 184-26 \/ 416\/26 remains the Gulf of Aden PAG keep-clear through 3 November. 183-26 remains the 26 October Al-Faw fire. 182-26 remains the 23 October outbound-Hormuz disablement, now named Ghana Prosperity on Update 109 as wrap, not as a 187-26 hull. 181-26 \/ Leonora Kosan remains Limah. 179-26 \/ Al Dasma remains Bukha. Cape Dao remains 403\/26 \/ the 23 September IMO row. Update 109 remains the last periodic threat note, Hormuz still SEVERE. 016-26 remains Wednesday afternoon\u2019s blockade document pack. Thursday\u2019s 768\/26 and 766\/26 remain the Kaliakra and Shabla Black Sea files. Do not recast 30 October as a named Louise 1, as a RITI conversion, as Update 110, as an IMO 122-count, or as a Hormuz closure.<\/p>\n<h2>What Operators Should Note<\/h2>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Log 187-26 as an Attack with attached devices, not as a projectile file and not as a dhow wreck.<\/strong> UKMTO Warning 187-26 Update 001, incident 29 October 2026, 2212 UTC, source Verified, Update 001 300150Z 30 October, location footer Khasab, Oman. Filename <code>20261029-ukmto_warning-187-26-update-001.pdf<\/code>. Strait of Hormuz, 25 nautical miles northeast of Khasab. Outbound tanker. Port-side small boat. Two explosive devices attached to the hull above the waterline. Engine-room fire. Temporarily disabled. Fire extinguished. Crew safe. No environmental impact. Continuing to next port of call. Transit with caution. Report suspicious activity to UKMTO, watchkeepers@ukmto.org \/ +44 (0)2392222060. Authorities are investigating. UKMTO printed neither hull, IMO, flag, cargo, attacker, lat\/long, anchorage nor a keep-clear radius. This is not 185-26, not 186-26, not 417\/26, not 420\/26, and not Update 109.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Hold the method line.<\/strong> 187-26 is Attack, not Suspicious Activity. The working weapon print is two explosive devices attached above the waterline from a small boat on the port side, not an unknown projectile and not a mine in the TSS. Do not brief Friday as \u201canother Hormuz drone\/missile hit, continuing, all well.\u201d Do not brief Friday as quiet because the fire is out.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Hold Louise 1 \/ Vanguard colour separately.<\/strong> Seatrade, quoting Vanguard Tech, adds Panama-flagged Louise 1, about 159,092 dwt, Aquarius Maritime Ventures. Reuters \/ Arab News reprints add no hull. None of those extras sit on the PDF. Do not promote Louise 1 to a 187-26 naming or to a flag line.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Do not collapse 420\/26 RITI or 186-26 onto this number.<\/strong> 420\/26 names oil tanker RITI, fire, anchored, 26-24.07N 056-24.72E, 1 nautical mile northwest of Ra\u2019s Tahir. 187-26 prints continuing, not anchored, and prints no name. 186-26 remains the unused 1600 UTC CSO unknown-projectile Attack. Two Thursday Attacks and one Friday NAVAREA naming are three products. Do not make them one hull.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Do not merge this watch onto the Quba wreck, Aden, Al-Faw, Limah, Bukha or Cape Dao.<\/strong> 417\/26 remains the dedicated MSV Quba sunk file, 26-19.95N 056-16.82E. 185-26 remains the 0300 UTC 9-nautical-mile north-of-Khasab fire. 184-26 \/ 416\/26 remains the Gulf of Aden PAG keep-clear through 3 November. 183-26 remains the 63-nautical-mile Al-Faw fire. 182-26 remains the outbound disablement, Ghana Prosperity on Update 109 as wrap only. 181-26 \/ Leonora Kosan remains Limah. 179-26 \/ Al Dasma remains Bukha. Cape Dao remains the 23 September 15-nautical-mile northeast-of-Khasab IMO wreck. Twenty-five nautical miles northeast of Khasab is a new offset. IMO still 121 \/ 24 as at 27 October. Update 109 ICOD remains 291300 UTC 29 October. 016-26 remains the blockade document pack.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Treat temporary disablement and continuing voyage as open damage lines.<\/strong> The public tape says the fire is out, the crew are safe, and there is no environmental impact. It does not print a survey, a hole size, a NUC interval, a tug, a next-port name or a class note. Keep Update 109 Hormuz SEVERE and 016-26 visit-and-search in the master\u2019s pack. Watch a PDF revision that names a hull or prints a lat\/long; a NAVAREA that plots this tanker; a flag or class note; a JMIC Update 110; or an IMO-board row \u2014 not a headline that Thursday night closed the strait or completed a salvage.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Regulas Shipping will keep lining Warning 187-26 Update 001 against Thursday\u2019s dedicated 185-26 fire sighting and against Update 109\u2019s earlier 291300 UTC cut-off so operators can treat Friday\u2019s tape as a numbered unnamed outbound-tanker Attack 25 nautical miles northeast of Khasab, not as a dhow-wreck rewrite, a named Louise 1, or a completed class survey.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations centre published Warning 187-26 Update 001 as a numbered PDF on its product board, filename 20261029-ukmto_warning-187-26-update-001.pdf. The face of the product is titled 187-26 \u2014 ATTACK UPDATE 001. The incident date is 29 October 2026. The incident time is 2212 UTC. The source line is Verified. UKMTO states that [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":1139,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"wpai_generated_summary":"","wpai_meta_description":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[26,18,4],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1141","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-highlights","category-maritime-industry","category-maritime-security"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/regulasshipping.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1141","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/regulasshipping.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/regulasshipping.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/regulasshipping.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/regulasshipping.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1141"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/regulasshipping.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1141\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/regulasshipping.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1139"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/regulasshipping.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1141"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/regulasshipping.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1141"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/regulasshipping.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1141"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}