The U.S. Navy-led Joint Maritime Information Center published Update 110 to its regional advisory note with an information cut-off of 011300 UTC on 1 November. The working primary retrieved this run is the numbered PDF posted on the UKMTO product board as jmic_advisory_update_110_01-nov-1.pdf. The face of the note is titled Update 110 to JMIC Advisory Note, 01 March – 01 November 2026. The information cut-off is printed as ICOD 011300 UTC. The note is printed as JMIC# 001 26. The regional threat level remains SEVERE. The Strait of Hormuz remains SEVERE. The Arabian Gulf remains SUBSTANTIAL. The Gulf of Oman stays MODERATE. The Arabian Sea stays MODERATE. The Gulf of Aden stays SUBSTANTIAL. Bab el-Mandeb / the southern Red Sea stay SUBSTANTIAL. The Somali Coast / Somali Basin stay MODERATE. The Northern Red Sea / Suez Canal stay MODERATE. The Eastern Mediterranean stays LOW. Confirmed vessel incidents since 1 March are now printed as 167, up from 160 on dedicated Update 109. The confirmed-incidents table adds six files since the last report: UKMTO 186-26, 187-26, 188-26, 189-26, 190-26 and MSCIO 160/26.
That is the working primary. Sunday night’s product is a numbered regional instrument, not a Hormuz reopen, not Update 111, and not a rewrite of this afternoon’s dedicated Update 109, Friday night’s dedicated Warning 188-26, Saturday morning’s dedicated Warning 189-26, Saturday night’s dedicated Warning 190-26, or Sunday morning’s dedicated MSCIO Alert 161/26. The useful facts for a DPA and a bridge team are the first JMIC conversions of unused 186-26 onto RITI, dedicated 187-26 onto Louise 1, dedicated 188-26 onto Al Mayeda and dedicated 189-26 onto Arzanah; the first JMIC collapse of 190-26 onto Sunday morning’s dedicated AZINI hijack; the 167-incident tally; the 1 November congestion print of about 175 hulls at Fujairah / Khor Fakkan and about 490 waiting outside the Strait; the 29–31 October U.S.-facilitated Hormuz count of 119; the 1 November CENTCOM blockade line of 144 redirected, four disabled and two boarded; and the outlook that still treats further Hormuz attacks as highly likely. Do not treat Saturday afternoon’s dedicated IMO 122-count as a substitute for this numbered note, and do not treat Update 109 as still the current public instrument. Sunday night’s dedicated Warning 191-26 sits after this cut-off and is not on this note.
What Update 110 actually added
The confirmed tape is the body of Update 110. ICOD 011300 UTC 1 November. JMIC# 001 26. Regional threat SEVERE. Six incidents since Update 109. Total 167 since 1 March. That is the product. Stay with that wording. Do not invent a seventh row for Sunday night’s dedicated 191-26. That clock sits after 011300 UTC. It is not on this note. Do not invent a Hormuz downgrade. Do not invent an IMO move off 122. Do not invent a completed Update 111.
On 186-26, Update 110 names the hull and ties the unused Warning to Friday night’s dedicated NAVAREA. The table prints the date line as 29 October UKMTO 186-26 and 30 October NAVAREA IX 420/26. Vessel: RITI. Vessel type: tanker. Event type: Attack. Location: Strait of Hormuz. The narrative says UKMTO received a report that on 29 October a tanker, identified by the Royal Navy of Oman as the RITI, was struck by an unknown projectile while transiting the Strait of Hormuz outbound in the vicinity of Khasab, Oman; a small fire ignited and was extinguished and the vessel lost propulsion; crew reported safe; no environmental impact reported; NAVAREA IX 420/26 reported the oil tanker anchored approximately 1 nautical mile northwest of Ra’s Tahir. That is the first numbered JMIC print of RITI against unused 186-26. Dedicated Warning 186-26 remains an unnamed CSO Attack, 1600 UTC 29 October, outbound Hormuz, Khasab footer, no reported injuries, no environmental impact report. Dedicated 420/26 remains the RITI fire-and-anchor at 26-24.07N 056-24.72E. Update 110 is the regional-note naming that now joins those two instruments. Hold all three. Do not invent a flag on this row. Do not invent a cargo grade beyond tanker. Do not invent a projectile type or an attacker. Do not collapse Louise 1, Al Mayeda or Arzanah onto this Khasab disablement.
On 187-26, Update 110 names the hull. Vessel: LOUISE 1. Vessel type: crude oil tanker. Event type: Attack. Location: Strait of Hormuz. The narrative says UKMTO received a report that on 29 October a tanker, identified by India’s Minister of Ports, Shipping and Waterways as the LOUISE 1, was approached approximately 25 nautical miles northeast of Khasab, Oman, by a small boat which attached two explosive devices to the hull above the waterline; the resulting blasts caused an engine-room fire that temporarily disabled the vessel; crew reported as safe; no environmental impact reported; the vessel continued its voyage. Dedicated Warning 187-26 remains an unnamed outbound-tanker Attack, 2212 UTC 29 October, 25 nautical miles northeast of Khasab, two attached devices, engine-room fire, temporarily disabled, fire extinguished, crew safe, continuing. Update 110 is the first numbered JMIC print of Louise 1 against that file. It is not a UKMTO PDF revision. Do not invent a flag. Do not invent an IMO number. Do not convert “continued its voyage” into a completed class survey.
On 188-26, Update 110 names the hull. Vessel: AL MAYEDA. Vessel type: LNG carrier. Event type: Attack. Location: Arabian Gulf. The narrative says UKMTO received a report that on 30 October an LNG carrier, identified by India’s Minister of Ports, Shipping and Waterways as the AL MAYEDA, was struck by projectiles approximately 40 nautical miles south of Lavan Island, Iran, causing a fire on board; crew reported as safe. Dedicated Warning 188-26 remains an unnamed vessel Attack, 1800 UTC 30 October, 40 nautical miles south of Lavan Island, unknown projectile on the port side, fire, crew reported safe, no reported environmental impact at this time. This afternoon’s dedicated Nakilat / Qatar Stock Exchange disclosure remains the company statement that Al Mayeda was hit by unidentified objects in the Arabian Gulf on Friday evening, crew uninjured, no environmental impact, vessel safe and operational. Update 110 is the first numbered JMIC print of Al Mayeda against 188-26. Hold all three instruments. Do not invent a lat/long beyond the 40-nautical-mile south-of-Lavan offset. Do not invent a projectile type. Do not collapse this Arabian Gulf Attack onto the three Hormuz rows.
On 189-26, Update 110 names the hull. Vessel: ARZANAH. Vessel type: VLCC. Event type: Attack. Location: Strait of Hormuz. The narrative says UKMTO received a report that on 28 October a VLCC, identified by India’s Minister of Ports, Shipping and Waterways as the ARZANAH, was struck by an unknown projectile while transiting outbound through the Strait of Hormuz; the vessel was damaged; crew reported as safe. Dedicated Warning 189-26 remains a time-late unnamed crude-oil-tanker Attack, 28 October, time TBC, source Verified, outbound Hormuz, unknown projectile, no crew or pollution line on the public PDF. Update 110 is the first numbered JMIC print of Arzanah against that file, and it is the first instrument on this desk that types the hull as a VLCC and prints damaged / crew safe. It is not a UKMTO PDF revision. Do not invent a flag. Do not invent an IMO number. Do not invent a lat/long. Do not convert “damaged” into a NUC, a tow or a wreck.
On MSCIO 160/26, Update 110 withholds the name. Vessel: unknown. Vessel type: unknown. Event type: Suspicious Activity. Location: Gulf of Aden. The narrative says that on 30 October MSCIO reported a fast skiff with four persons on board, reportedly fitted with a mounted machine gun, approached a merchant vessel to approximately 300 metres approximately 50 nautical miles south of Aden before aborting when the embarked armed security team displayed weapons. Sunday morning’s dedicated 161/26 piece already carried 160/26 as wrap: 11-57.4N 045-04.5E, two craft / greenish skiff, four persons, mounted MG, 300 metres astern, aborted after AST weapons display, no shots, no boarding. Update 110 reprints that approach as a numbered row and places it about 50 nautical miles south of Aden. It does not name the merchant hull. It does not convert Suspicious Activity into Attack. Do not collapse 184-26 / 416/26 onto this skiff.
On 161/26 and 190-26, Update 110 names the fishing vessel and collapses the two products. The table prints the date line as 30 October MSCIO 161/26 and 31 October UKMTO 190-26. Vessel: AZINI. Vessel type: fishing vessel. Event type: Suspicious activity. Location: Somali Basin. The narrative says MSCIO and UKMTO received a report that on 29 October a large fishing vessel, identified by MSCIO as the AZINI, had been boarded and taken by armed persons east-southeast of Socotra; suspected Pirate Action Group activity. Sunday morning’s dedicated MSCIO Alert 161/26 remains the working hijack instrument: Iranian fishing vessel AZINI, about 09:00 UTC 29 October, last reported 09-42N 053-55E then 09-47N 055-45E, mothership potential, ATALANTA investigating. Saturday night’s dedicated Warning 190-26 remains an unnamed large-fishing-vessel boarding, 1419 UTC 30 October, PAG concern, no lat/long on the public PDF. Update 110 is the first numbered JMIC print that joins those two files on AZINI and places the boarding east-southeast of Socotra. It does not convert Suspicious activity into Attack. It does not print a merchant target. It does not cancel 416/26.
The Arabian Gulf operational summary is the paragraph that should replace Update 109’s version in the master’s pack. One attack was reported in this period (UKMTO 188-26). This is the sixth attack inside the Arabian Gulf since 7 October and the first in the central Gulf in this period; no further disruptions were reported. Traffic flows continued, with anchorage congestion high across the region. The 24–48-hour outlook is unchanged in kind: six attacks inside the Gulf since 7 October, including the 30 October attack on a vessel south of Lavan Island, show that attacks remain a strong possibility throughout the Arabian Gulf, including the central Gulf, anchorages and STS areas. Electronic interference, which rose again on 30 October, presents a credible concern in the central and southern Arabian Gulf. Vessels stationary for extended periods, or maintaining AIS-on while static, may face elevated targeting risk.
The Strait of Hormuz summary carries three Attacks in the period (186-26, 187-26 and 189-26). From 28–29 October three vessels were attacked off Musandam. Confirmed attacks since 6 October total 18. IRGC attacks, attempted attacks and/or harassment persisted, including UAV overflight, targeted surveillance of merchant shipping and occasional VHF hailing. Commercial traffic through the Strait remained at reduced levels against the 2025 baseline of about 138 vessels a day. Independent tracking still indicated single-digit transits. U.S. NCAGS data indicated U.S.-assisted flows averaging about 39 vessel transits over the last 72 hours. U.S.-facilitated Strait of Hormuz transits for 29–31 October, the past 72 hours, are printed as 119. Do not add the 119, the 39-over-72-hours series and the independent single-digit series into one throughput figure. Mariners are still advised to remain vigilant for attempted mining within and adjacent to the traffic-separation scheme. AIS-on vessels can expect elevated targeting risk and directed hails instructing them to divert toward the northern Iranian-controlled route. A 30-nautical-mile standoff from U.S. units remains advised. JMIC Advisory Note 016-26 of 28 October, already the dedicated blockade document-pack piece on this desk, is reprinted as the clearance-request tool.
What sits off the list, and the traffic that moved
Sunday’s cut-off is 011300 UTC on 1 November. Update 110 does not print Sunday night’s dedicated Warning 191-26 (Merchant Vessel, 1509 UTC 1 November, Channel 16 Mayday relay, another vessel, unknown projectile, Strait of Hormuz). That product sits after the cut-off. It is not a completed Update 111. Do not back-fit a 1509 UTC Mayday onto a 1300 UTC table.
The Gulf of Oman summary says no confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period. Naval presence remained elevated because of blockade enforcement. The latest official CENTCOM figures cited in Update 110, dated 1 November, are 144 commercial vessels redirected; four vessels disabled as a result of blockade enforcement; two boarded for blockade compliance. That is a move off Update 109’s 17 October line of 138 redirected, four disabled and two boarded. No further CENTCOM blockade-enforcement action was announced in this period. On 28 October, Advisory Note 016-26 relayed the USNAVCENT NCAGS notice that the United States is enforcing a blockade of all Iranian ports. Vessels were expected to respond promptly to military queries and maintain AIS-on unless constrained by security threats.
The Arabian Sea paragraph is marked no change. The Gulf of Aden paragraph carries MSCIO 160/26 as the 30 October armed-skiff approach about 50 nautical miles south of Aden and reprints 184-26 / 416/26 as the 28 October suspected Pirate Action Group, in force until 3 November. On 30 October, Yemen’s government military spokesperson reported Houthi ballistic missile attacks targeting Aden International Airport and Al-Maashiq Presidential Palace; explosions were reported; damage, casualties and effects on shipping or Aden port operations remain unverified. Commercial traffic remained relatively steady. Southern Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb traffic remains below the 20 July Houthi selective embargo, broadly stable at about 35 transits a day on AIS tracking. The last confirmed Houthi attack on a merchant vessel on this note remains 24 August. MT ASANA, the Tanzanian-flag product/chemical tanker hijacked on 17 July about 65 nautical miles southwest of Mukalla, is still the one merchant vessel remaining hijacked. The southwest monsoon subsided on 15 October; the AZINI mothership-potential line is now on this note, with PAG range assessed as likely to extend across the northern Somali Basin toward the shipping routes east and south of Socotra.
Infrastructure colour is quieter against Update 109. No attack on ports, terminals, offshore platforms, oil and gas loading facilities or subsea infrastructure was reported in this period. The overall infrastructure risk remains MODERATE. Do not restore Update 109’s Ras Tanura heat detection or the 28–29 October Mocha / Dhubab strikes as new facts on this note. Those sentences sat on Update 109. They are not reprinted here as fresh events.
Port and anchorage congestion is printed as of 1 November. About 175 vessels were at anchor in the vicinity of Fujairah / Khor Fakkan. About 153 were off Dubai / Jebel Ali to Ras Al Khaimah, mainly off Sharjah / Ajman / Umm Al Quwain. About 57 were in the vicinity of Musandam / Sohar. About 29 were off Bandar Abbas / Qeshm. There was no mass departure, new cluster or gap near an attack area. Approximately 490 vessels were waiting outside the Strait of Hormuz on 1 November, against single-digit to low-double-digit AIS-visible transits per day; the backlog is expected to persist. Data limits: internal AIS estimates; AIS-dark vessels excluded. Periodic repositioning remains advisable. Stationary AIS-on hulls may face elevated targeting risk.
GNSS / AIS interference in the Arabian Gulf rose again on 30 October, back towards the 23–25 October level, concentrated along the UAE coast from Abu Dhabi to Ras Al Khaimah and the Saudi / Bahrain coast near Dammam. Windward recorded 174 jammed vessels of 6,757 transmitting in the Gulf and Gulf of Oman on 29 October, 48 percent below its seven-day average, confirming continued but reduced effects on shipping. UKMTO’s weekly VRA report for the week ending 30 October recorded four vessel GNSS reports, up from one the week before. The Strait of Hormuz remained at the established baseline, and the Gulf of Oman was marginal. In the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb, no significant GNSS interference was observed at sea. No new specific UKMTO, MARAD, NAVCENT or NAVAREA IX GNSS/EMI notices were issued 29–31 October. Baseline advisories remain in force. Cross-check with radar and visual navigation.
The annex is the independent traffic colour Update 109 did not yet have for 29–31 October. Independent cargo-vessel transits through the Strait, S&P Maritime / SeaVision, excluding Iranian-port callers, are printed as 1, 3, 2, 2, 3, 4 and 4 for 25 through 31 October. Independent tanker transits for the same week are 1, 2, 0, 1, 2, 0 and 4. Bab el-Mandeb cargo totals for those seven days are 18, 19, 15, 4, 16, 24 and 33. Bab el-Mandeb tanker totals are 11, 20, 5, 1, 10, 8 and 15. Do not add those independent figures to the 119 U.S.-facilitated count. UKMTO’s own transit, latest-incidents and AIS-anomaly boards are printed as annex headings updated 29 October, without a new weekly anomaly total on the retrieved PDF.
What this is not
This is not Update 111, and it is not a rewrite of dedicated Update 109. Update 109, ICOD 291300 UTC 29 October, 160 incidents, remains the previous numbered public periodic note. Update 110 replaces it. Masters who still brief the region as Update 109 will have the wrong instrument in the folder. Masters who brief Sunday night as Update 111 will have invented a later cut-off this desk has not retrieved. Sunday night’s dedicated 191-26 is a post-cut-off Attack, not a seventh row on this table.
This is not a rewrite of unused 186-26, and it is not a UKMTO PDF naming of RITI. Dedicated Warning 186-26 remains an unnamed CSO Attack, 1600 UTC 29 October, outbound Hormuz, Khasab footer. Dedicated 420/26 remains the RITI fire-and-anchor at 26-24.07N 056-24.72E. Update 110 is the first numbered JMIC print that joins those two files on RITI, adds a lost-propulsion line and a small fire extinguished, and attributes the identification to the Royal Navy of Oman. Three instruments. Do not collapse them into one “UKMTO named RITI on 186-26” sentence. Do not move RITI onto 187-26, 188-26, 189-26 or 191-26.
This is not a rewrite of 187-26, 188-26 or 189-26, and it is not a UKMTO PDF naming of Louise 1, Al Mayeda or Arzanah. Dedicated 187-26 remains the unnamed 2212 UTC attached-device Attack 25 nautical miles northeast of Khasab. Dedicated 188-26 remains the unnamed 1800 UTC Lavan Attack. Dedicated 189-26 remains the unnamed time-late 28 October outbound Attack. This afternoon’s dedicated Nakilat statement remains the company confirmation of Al Mayeda. India’s Minister of Ports, Shipping and Waterways is the identifier JMIC prints for Louise 1, Al Mayeda and Arzanah. That is a JMIC sourcing line. It is not a UKMTO PDF revision and it is not an IMO-board move. Do not promote those three names onto the public Warning PDFs.
This is not a rewrite of 190-26 or of Sunday morning’s dedicated AZINI hijack. 190-26 remains the dedicated 1419 UTC unnamed boarding. 161/26 remains Sunday morning’s dedicated MSCIO hijack instrument, 09-47N 055-45E, mothership potential. Update 110 is wrap that now joins those two files on AZINI and places the boarding east-southeast of Socotra. It does not print a merchant target, a keep-clear radius or a corridor closure. 184-26 / 416/26 remains the Aden keep-clear at 12-42N 047-35E through 032359 UTC 3 November. Do not convert the AZINI row into a completed merchant hijack.
This is not an International Maritime Organization 123-count. Saturday afternoon’s dedicated IMO highlighted-incidents board remains 122 confirmed / 24 seafarer fatalities as at 30 October. JMIC’s 167 and IMO’s 122 are different datasets. Wednesday afternoon’s dedicated JMIC Advisory Note 016-26 remains the blockade visit-and-search document pack; Update 110 reprints the pack, it does not replace it. This is not Thursday’s dedicated Contship Jet or Khoryv Black Sea files, and it is not Saturday’s dedicated NAVWARN 775/26, 776/26 or 777/26. NAVAREA IX 424/26, the new 011500 UTC Pakistan live-weapon-firing box for 0300–0600 UTC on 3 and 4 November, is unused as a dedicated file this run.
Operational implications
A numbered JMIC update is a routing and manning problem before it is a count of who was hit. Hormuz is still SEVERE, with deliberate attacks called highly likely, AIS-on targeting risk, directed hails toward the northern Iranian-controlled route, and a specific watch for attempted mining within and adjacent to the traffic-separation scheme. That guidance did not move because six more files cleared the table. The Arabian Gulf column did not move either. It stays SUBSTANTIAL. What moved is the four Attack namings — RITI against unused 186-26 and dedicated 420/26, Louise 1 against dedicated 187-26, Al Mayeda against dedicated 188-26, Arzanah against dedicated 189-26 — the AZINI collapse of 190-26 onto 161/26, the incident tally from 160 to 167, the congestion print from Update 109’s 29 October figure of about 181 hulls at Fujairah / Khor Fakkan down to about 175 on 1 November, with about 490 still waiting outside the Strait, the facilitated count from 120 over 25–28 October to 119 over 29–31 October, the CENTCOM blockade line from 138 redirected on 17 October to 144 on 1 November, and the GNSS colour from Windward’s 27 October 326 jammed print to a 29 October 174 jammed / 6,757 transmitting print. Masters who still brief the region as Update 109 will have the wrong instrument in the folder. Masters who brief Sunday night as a Hormuz downgrade will have the wrong scale on the chart.
The four Attack paragraphs are a briefing-discipline problem, not four new casualties. Thursday’s unused 186-26 left an outbound Hormuz tanker unnamed. Friday night’s dedicated 420/26 already named RITI as a fire-and-anchor. Update 110 is the first numbered JMIC note that prints RITI against 186-26, adds lost propulsion and a small fire extinguished, and attributes the identification to the Royal Navy of Oman. Friday morning’s dedicated 187-26 left the attached-device tanker unnamed; Update 110 now prints Louise 1 and attributes that identification to India’s shipping minister. Friday night’s dedicated 188-26 left the Lavan projectile unnamed; this afternoon’s Nakilat statement named Al Mayeda as a company disclosure; Update 110 is the first JMIC print of Al Mayeda against 188-26 as an LNG carrier. Saturday morning’s dedicated 189-26 left the time-late outbound tanker unnamed; Update 110 now prints Arzanah as a VLCC, damaged, crew safe. A master’s pack that briefs “UKMTO named RITI, Louise 1, Al Mayeda and Arzanah” has over-read four JMIC rows. A pack that briefs those four hulls as still steaming because an earlier PDF said one of them continued, or as one Sunday casualty because 191-26 later printed a Mayday, has collapsed five instruments. Hold the PDFs, the Nakilat statement, the 420/26 NAVAREA, the JMIC namings, and Sunday night’s dedicated 191-26 as separate sheets.
The Fujairah density and the 490-vessel wait are the other operator facts. Update 110 still parks that density against a Strait that printed single-digit independent cargo transits on several days in the annex and four independent tanker transits on 31 October. Vessels stationary for extended periods, or maintaining AIS-on while static, may face elevated targeting risk. Harbour assists, wreck response and disabled-hull tows operating in that density are in the same watch as shuttle tankers. AIS-off is not a detection shield and is not an order on this note. Do not merge RITI’s Ra’s Tahir anchorage onto the Fujairah line, and do not merge Ghana Prosperity’s earlier Musandam anchorage onto it.
CSOs should replace the 29 October Update 109 pack with Update 110 in the master’s folder and in the charterer’s security clause file. The new named lines are 186-26 / 420/26 RITI, tanker, unknown projectile outbound IVO Khasab, small fire extinguished, lost propulsion, crew safe, anchored about 1 nautical mile northwest of Ra’s Tahir; 187-26 Louise 1, crude oil tanker, two attached devices 25 nautical miles northeast of Khasab, engine-room fire, temporarily disabled, continued; 188-26 Al Mayeda, LNG carrier, projectiles 40 nautical miles south of Lavan Island, fire, crew safe; 189-26 Arzanah, VLCC, unknown projectile outbound Hormuz 28 October, damaged, crew safe; 161/26 / 190-26 AZINI, fishing vessel, boarded and taken east-southeast of Socotra, suspected PAG. The new tally is 167 since 1 March. The new congestion line is about 175 hulls in the vicinity of Fujairah / Khor Fakkan as of 1 November and about 490 waiting outside the Strait. The new facilitated count is 119 U.S.-assisted Hormuz transits over 29–31 October. The new CENTCOM line is 144 redirected, four disabled, two boarded as at 1 November. The new GNSS colour is Windward’s 29 October print of 174 jammed vessels of 6,757 transmitting. None of those edits is a flag circular, a class condition, or a completed MARPOL finding. Do not replace Friday’s dedicated 188-26 PDF, Saturday morning’s dedicated 189-26, Saturday night’s dedicated 190-26, Sunday morning’s dedicated 161/26, this afternoon’s dedicated Nakilat statement, Wednesday’s dedicated 016-26 pack, or Sunday night’s dedicated 191-26. They are different instruments. Update 110 is the numbered regional threat note that now sits on top of Update 109.
For a master already shaping Musandam, holding off Fujairah or Khor Fakkan, or still needing a blockade clearance, Sunday night is a document-pack and lookout problem before it is a policy problem. 016-26 remains the working visit-and-search list. Update 110 reprints it; it does not shorten it. Channel 16, the UKMTO emergency line, the MSCIO emergency line and the company duty officer still have to be on the night orders. Registering with one mailbox is not a substitute for the other. Update 110 does not order a daylight-only transit, a deviation around 12-42N 047-35E beyond the existing 416/26 keep-clear, or a halt to visit-and-search compliance. It also does not authorise a master to treat every AIS-on tanker in the Strait as RITI, Louise 1 or Arzanah after the fact. Sunday night’s dedicated 191-26 remains a separate Mayday-relay Attack after this cut-off.
Charterers, P&I and war-risk underwriters will now ask whether the ship was in the Voluntary Reporting Area after 011300 UTC 1 November, whether it was near Khasab after the RITI and Louise 1 rows, whether it was south of Lavan after the Al Mayeda row, whether it held the 016-26 pack, and whether it was following BMP-MS. They will not be answered by Sunday night’s 191-26 Mayday, by Saturday’s 122-count, or by a headline that four JMIC namings closed those files. Off-hire and deviation conversations that treat Update 110 as a completed Hormuz reopen, or as a UKMTO PDF naming of the four Attack hulls, have misread the cut-off.
Keep the dedicated files on their own lines. 186-26 remains the unused 1600 UTC unnamed outbound-Hormuz Attack; RITI on this note and on Friday night’s dedicated 420/26 is wrap on that PDF, not a UKMTO naming. 187-26 remains Friday morning’s unnamed attached-device Attack; Louise 1 on this note is wrap. 188-26 remains Friday night’s unnamed Lavan Attack; Al Mayeda on this note and on this afternoon’s dedicated Nakilat statement is wrap. 189-26 remains Saturday morning’s unnamed time-late Hormuz Attack; Arzanah on this note is wrap. 190-26 remains Saturday night’s unnamed fishing-vessel boarding; AZINI on this note and on Sunday morning’s dedicated 161/26 is wrap. 191-26 remains Sunday night’s dedicated Mayday-relay Attack after this cut-off. 184-26 / 416/26 remains the Gulf of Aden PAG keep-clear through 3 November. 185-26 remains Thursday’s 9-nautical-mile north-of-Khasab fire sighting. 182-26 remains the 23 October outbound disablement, Ghana Prosperity on Update 109 and the IMO 122-count as wrap. 016-26 remains Wednesday afternoon’s blockade document pack. Saturday’s dedicated 775/26, 776/26 and 777/26 remain the Bulgarian territorial-sea e-mail, the Galata diving box and the Burgas cutter. Sunday morning’s dedicated ARN 162/2026 remains the Romanian two-nautical-mile drifting-object watch through 021000 UTC 2 November. NAVAREA IX 424/26 remains the unused 3–4 November Pakistan firing box. Do not recast 1 November night as a Hormuz reopen, as four UKMTO PDF namings, as Update 111, as an IMO 123-count, or as a corridor closure.
What Operators Should Note
- Log Update 110, ICOD 011300 UTC 1 November, not a Hormuz downgrade. JMIC# 001 26. Filename
jmic_advisory_update_110_01-nov-1.pdf. Regional threat SEVERE. Hormuz SEVERE. Arabian Gulf SUBSTANTIAL. Gulf of Oman MODERATE. Arabian Sea MODERATE. Gulf of Aden SUBSTANTIAL. Bab el-Mandeb / southern Red Sea SUBSTANTIAL. Somali Coast / Somali Basin MODERATE. Northern Red Sea / Suez MODERATE. Eastern Mediterranean LOW. 167 incidents since 1 March, six files since Update 109 (186-26, 187-26, 188-26, 189-26, 190-26 and MSCIO 160/26). Replace Update 109 in the master’s pack. Do not confuse this numbered note with the IMO highlighted-incidents board’s count of 122 as at 30 October, and do not stretch it to Sunday night’s dedicated 191-26. - Type the four Attack rows as JMIC typed them, and hold the dedicated PDFs beside them. RITI, tanker, unknown projectile outbound IVO Khasab 29 October, small fire extinguished, lost propulsion, crew safe, anchored about 1 nautical mile northwest of Ra’s Tahir; Royal Navy of Oman identification; dedicated 186-26 remains unnamed, dedicated 420/26 remains the plot. Louise 1, crude oil tanker, two attached devices 25 nautical miles northeast of Khasab, engine-room fire, temporarily disabled, continued; India’s shipping-minister identification; dedicated 187-26 remains unnamed. Al Mayeda, LNG carrier, projectiles 40 nautical miles south of Lavan Island, fire, crew safe; India’s shipping-minister identification; dedicated 188-26 remains unnamed; this afternoon’s Nakilat statement remains the company confirmation. Arzanah, VLCC, unknown projectile outbound Hormuz 28 October, damaged, crew safe; India’s shipping-minister identification; dedicated 189-26 remains unnamed. Do not invent flags, IMO numbers or attackers. Do not brief those four names as UKMTO PDF namings.
- Treat the Fujairah density and the 490-vessel wait as live routing, not as a published closure. About 175 vessels were at anchor IVO Fujairah / Khor Fakkan as of 1 November; about 153 Dubai / Jebel Ali to Ras Al Khaimah; about 57 Musandam / Sohar; about 29 Bandar Abbas / Qeshm. About 490 waiting outside the Strait against single-digit to low-double-digit AIS-visible transits. U.S.-facilitated Hormuz transits 29–31 October: 119. Independent Strait cargo series 25–31 October: 1, 3, 2, 2, 3, 4, 4. Independent tanker series: 1, 2, 0, 1, 2, 0, 4. CENTCOM as at 1 November: 144 redirected, four disabled, two boarded. Do not add those series into one throughput figure. Stationary AIS-on hulls may face elevated targeting risk. Periodic repositioning remains advisable.
- Keep the 016-26 pack, the mining watch and the reduced-but-live GNSS baseline. Update 110 reprints Advisory Note 016-26: last-port clearance, bill of lading, registry, agent letter, receipts or contracts, berth booking, VHF 16, 30-nautical-mile standoff from U.S. units, NAVCENT NCAGS mailbox. AIS-on targeting risk and directed hails toward the northern Iranian-controlled route remain. Attempted mining within and adjacent to the TSS remains on the outlook. Windward’s 29 October print is 174 jammed vessels of 6,757 transmitting in the Gulf and Gulf of Oman, 48 percent below its seven-day average. UKMTO’s week-ending 30 October VRA report recorded four GNSS reports, up from one. No new UKMTO, MARAD, NAVCENT or NAVAREA IX GNSS/EMI notice was issued 29–31 October. Cross-check with radar and visual navigation.
- Hold AZINI, Aden and the post-cut-off Mayday on their own lines. 161/26 remains Sunday morning’s dedicated AZINI hijack; 190-26 remains Saturday night’s unnamed boarding; Update 110 joins them as wrap, east-southeast of Socotra, mothership potential toward routes east and south of Socotra. 160/26 remains the 50-nautical-mile south-of-Aden armed-skiff abort. 184-26 / 416/26 remains the Aden keep-clear through 032359 UTC 3 November. 191-26 remains Sunday night’s dedicated Channel 16 Mayday-relay Attack after this cut-off. Asana is still hijacked. The last confirmed Houthi merchant attack on this note remains 24 August. Do not promote a merchant target onto AZINI, and do not promote 191-26 onto this table.
- Log the 18 Hormuz attacks since 6 October and the sixth Arabian Gulf attack since 7 October as scale, not as a corridor closure. Three Musandam Attacks on 28–29 October sit on this note. 188-26 is the first central-Gulf Attack in the period. Infrastructure risk remains MODERATE; no port, terminal or subsea attack was reported in this period. Watch Update 111, a UKMTO PDF after 191-26, or an IMO-board move off 122 — not a headline that Sunday night reopened Hormuz or completed four UKMTO namings.
Regulas Shipping will keep lining Update 110’s 011300 UTC cut-off against dedicated Warnings 186-26 through 191-26, this afternoon’s Nakilat Al Mayeda statement, and Saturday afternoon’s IMO 122-count so operators can treat Sunday night’s RITI, Louise 1, Al Mayeda and Arzanah namings, the 167-incident tally and the 490-vessel wait as a live routing pack, not as a Hormuz reopen or a completed Update 111.
