Reuters’ Jonathan Saul, writing from London on Wednesday, 7 October, said attacks on tankers sailing through the Strait of Hormuz had hit their highest last week of any week since the Iran war began, according to maritime security sources tracking incidents, amid a bigger export push by Gulf producers. gCaptain, Al-Monitor, Zawya and The Star carried the same Reuters copy. That is the working primary. It is a weekly-tempo file, not a new named hull, not a rewrite of Tuesday’s dedicated On Peace casualty, and not a substitute for Warning 158-26, the separate Wednesday evening inner-Gulf Attack product north of Qatar.
The useful facts for a DPA and a Gulf master are the three-source count, the IMO lag, and a JMIC picture that was still describing persistent IRGC harassment on Sunday. Do not collapse those three numbers into one ship list, and do not treat a wartime weekly high as a finding that the southern Omani corridor has closed or reopened.
What the sources counted, and what IMO had verified
In the week of 28 September to 5 October there had been at least 12 attacks on oil, liquefied-natural-gas and liquefied-petroleum-gas tankers around the Strait of Hormuz, according to data from three maritime security sources who analysed incidents based on information received from the area. That was the highest number of attacks in a single week since the U.S. war with Iran began on 28 February, the sources said.
Separate data collated by the International Maritime Organization showed nine incidents involving vessels in the same week. Reuters noted that the UN body tends to take longer to verify and officially record incidents. The closest week in terms of comparable IMO incidents was the week of 13 July, when there were eight. Hold those as two ledgers. The 12 is a security-source attack count on oil, LNG and LPG tankers around the strait. The 9 is an IMO incident count for the same week, not yet a completed board that names every hull. Do not add them together, and do not subtract them to invent unreported ships.
Al Jazeera, filing after Warning 158-26, said UKMTO had stated on Tuesday that there had been nine attacks on tankers in the Strait of Hormuz this month, representing half of the September total in the waterway and the Gulf combined. That is a calendar-October UKMTO line, not the 28 September–5 October security-source week, and not IMO’s nine. Seatrade, writing around the 5 October warning burst, had already counted nine UKMTO reports in October to date at that earlier cut, eight of them Hormuz attacks and one in the Bab el-Mandeb. Time-late products mean a reporting-day total is not a closed ship count. Do not use Tuesday’s nine, Seatrade’s nine, IMO’s nine and the sources’ 12 as if they were the same 12 hulls.
What JMIC was still saying on Sunday
The U.S. Navy-led Joint Maritime Information Center, in a note on Sunday, said attacks, attempted attacks and harassment activity including drone overflights, surveillance and hailing using VHF radio by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards had persisted in the strait. “These actions continue to demonstrate Iran’s intent to assert presence along key transit lanes and maintain pressure on transiting vessels,” JMIC said, in the sentence Reuters quoted.
The last public numbered regional note operators have on the bridge is still Update 102, information cut-off 041500 UTC on 4 October, which held the Strait of Hormuz at SEVERE. That note listed four confirmed attacks or disruptions in its own 72-hour window: 147-26, 148-26, 149-26 and 150-26, names withheld until further notice, unknown-projectile strikes on tankers, attacks along the Omani side continuing. Independent tracking in that note showed single-digit transits in each direction. U.S. NCAGS data put traffic at about 32 vessel transits a day over the previous 72 hours, against a 2025 baseline of about 138 a day. AIS-on still carried elevated targeting risk and directed hails toward the northern Iranian-controlled route. Mining watch in and adjacent to the TSS remained in the outlook. 153-26 through 157-26, Tuesday’s named On Peace casualty, and Wednesday’s 158-26 Gulf product all sit outside Update 102’s cut-off. Reuters’ weekly high is a 28 September–5 October count that overlaps that note and then runs past it. It is not a new numbered JMIC update, and it is not a downgrade from SEVERE.
Export colour is not an all-clear
Reuters said Gulf oil exporters had topped pre-war levels for about half of September, though attacks on tankers and logistical constraints clouded the outlook for sustained higher flows. Al Jazeera, citing Kpler, said the seven-day moving average of Middle East crude exports reached 18.3 million barrels a day on 30 September, compared with about 18 million barrels a day on average in the 12 months before the war. That is the same restored-flow colour already used around the dedicated Hormuz files. It is not a transit-rule change, not a Hormuz reopen, and not a reason to drop BMP. IMO’s public Middle East page was still showing a 4 October transit graphic and a paused evacuation plan at the time of writing. TokenPost, recapping the IMO board as at 5 October, had 93 confirmed incidents and 24 seafarer fatalities on that tally, with Lipsi, Promise and Kazimah III among the early-October damage lines. Those board names remain their own files. Do not brief Wednesday’s weekly high as an IMO board rewrite.
India’s Ministry of External Affairs said on Tuesday that 12 crew members were injured after an unknown projectile struck Panama-flag oil tanker On Peace while it was passing through the Strait of Hormuz. That sentence in the Reuters wrap is Tuesday’s dedicated casualty, used here only as the human end of the same week. Do not rewrite On Peace. Do not assign the sources’ 12 attacks to that one hull.
Operational implications
A wartime weekly high on a route that Update 102 still rates SEVERE is a crewing, routing and insurance problem, not a press-count problem. Masters already in the southern Omani corridor, the Musandam approaches and the first miles toward Fujairah or Khor Fakkan should expect the after-end hit pattern from Update 102 to remain the working threat: unknown projectiles, engine-room and port-quarter damage, short blackouts, tugs toward Fujairah. Citadel, fire-main isolation, emergency generator and steering-gear redundancy stay the night orders. A weekly peak also means a higher chance of meeting a disabled, AIS-dark tanker in the TSS or just outside it. That lookout is separate from Wednesday’s inner-Gulf 158-26 file.
Charterers who used September’s restored export volumes to argue for a return to pre-war schedules should read Reuters’ clouded-outlook line against the 12-count. LNG and LPG are inside the security-source tally, not only crude. Shuttle tankers running Gulf load to Fujairah STS, and long-haul ships waiting in the Gulf of Oman, sit in the same threat box as a Hormuz transit even when they never enter the TSS. Time-late UKMTO products mean a quiet afternoon on VHF is not evidence that the day’s attacks have been logged.
Hold the published hygiene from Update 102: neutral transit, prompt answers to military queries, NAVCENT NCAGS for any Iran-port humanitarian exception, a 30-nautical-mile standoff from U.S. units, and no cargo loaded in Iran beyond fuel and stores on an approved exemption. CENTCOM’s 130th redirected vessel on 5 October remains blockade hygiene, not a weekly-count naming. Oman’s Article 10 AIS-on rule inside territorial waters was not withdrawn. The two instructions do not cancel. Dark mitigation against projectile risk becomes a compliance problem inside 12 nautical miles. Do not fold this weekly high into Yanbu loadings, the UAE MPCI container-filing mandate, the Premier Alliance FE1 Suez return, Japan’s 35-ship vessel-level permit, or Iran’s Persian Gulf Strait Authority declaration channel. Those are crude-export, documentation, liner, sanctions and coastal-state products. Wednesday’s Reuters file is a three-source weekly peak plus an IMO lag.
What Operators Should Note
- Log a wartime weekly high, not a new named hull. Reuters, 7 October: at least 12 attacks on oil, LNG and LPG tankers around Hormuz in the week of 28 September–5 October, three maritime security sources, highest single week since 28 February. Do not invent names to fill the count, and do not treat the 12 as a UKMTO product list.
- Keep IMO’s nine on a separate line. IMO recorded nine incidents in the same week and takes longer to verify. The closest comparable IMO week was 13 July, with eight. Do not add IMO’s nine to the sources’ 12. Do not use Al Jazeera’s Tuesday UKMTO “nine this month” or Seatrade’s earlier October reporting-day nine as if they were the same ledger.
- Update 102 is still the last numbered JMIC note, ICOD 041500 UTC 4 October, still SEVERE. Reuters quoted the Sunday JMIC line on persistent IRGC UAV overflight, surveillance and VHF hailing. Independent transits in that note remain single-digit; NCAGS about 32 a day versus a 2025 baseline of about 138. 153-26 through 157-26 sit outside the cut-off.
- On Peace is Tuesday’s dedicated casualty, not this article. India MEA: Panama-flag On Peace, 12 injured, unknown projectile, Hormuz. Use it only as the human end of the same week. Wednesday’s Warning 158-26 north of Qatar is a separate inner-Gulf Attack product with a casualty line; do not add it to the 28 September–5 October 12.
- Restored September export volumes are not an all-clear. Reuters: Gulf exporters topped pre-war levels for about half of September; attacks and logistics still cloud sustained higher flows. Keep BMP, war-risk clauses, the after-end hit pattern and a disabled-hull lookout on the southern Omani corridor.
- Do not recast Wednesday as a Hormuz reopen, a JMIC downgrade, or a completed IMO board. CSO, master, flag, class and P&I still own each unnamed Attack warning until UKMTO names the hull, a pollution volume appears, or a later numbered JMIC update takes the week onto the list.
Regulas Shipping will keep lining the 28 September–5 October security-source count against IMO’s slower nine and Update 102 so operators can treat last week’s wartime high as a tempo warning on a strait that is still SEVERE, not as a closed tape or a reason to assume the southern Omani corridor has gone quiet.
